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VECTORAL FEDERALISM
Scott Dodson*
INTRODUCTION

To say that the Supreme Court's recent federalism jurisprudence
has been erratic may be an understatement. 1 Take, for example,
Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity, the right of a state to
refuse to appear as a defendant in court. 2 The Court's
pronouncements on state sovereign immunity have been overruled by
constitutional amendment,3 have been overruled by the Court itself,4
have been gouged by exceptions that have not been fully justified,5
• Attorney, United States Department of Commerce, Office of Special Counsel, Complex
Litigation Unit. The views expressed herein are mine alone and do not necessarily represent those of any
other person or entity.
I. See Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REv. I, 6 (2002) ("[T)he Supreme
Court's federalism decisions have been somewhat erratic .... "); Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the
People's Affection: Federalism's Forgotten Marketplace, 56 V AND. L. REv. 329, 330 (2003) (asserting
that the Court "has failed to articulate an overarching vision of federal-state relations"). For some
stronger statements, see irifra note 9 (citing authorities).
2. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 43, 76 (1996) ("The Eleventh Amendment prohibits
Congress from making the state of Florida capable of being sued in federal court.").
3. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), the Court held that under Article Ill of the
Constitution, which extends the judicial power to controversies between a state and citizens of another
state, state sovereign immunity did not preclude federal courts from adjudicating common law suits
brought by a citizen of one state against a different state. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 450-51 (Blair, J.); id.
at 465-66 (Wilson, J.); id. at 467-68 (Cushing, J.); id. at 470.77 (Jay, C.J.). The passing of the Eleventh
Amendment, which affords immunity to a state from suits brought by citizens of a different state,
dramatically superceded the Court's decision in Chisholm. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State .... "). For a historical account
of Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment, see generally John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and
State Sovereign lm11IW'Iity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1926-34 (1983); John E.
Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and
the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1436-40 (1975).
4. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. I (1989), a plurality of the Court held that Congress
could eliminate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its power under the Interstate Commerce Clause of
Article I. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19. Seven years and several membership changes later, the Court
overruled Union Gas in Seminole Tribe, a case that challenged Congress' abrogation authority under the
Indian Commerce Clause of Article I. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73 ("In overruling Union Gas
today, we reconfirm that the background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the
Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area, like the
regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the Federal Government.").
5. The Court has held that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity when legislating
pursuant to its Article I powers, but Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the
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and have taken on a scope that--even the Court itself admits-lacks
foundation in the Constitution's text. 6 The result has been a protean
Fourteenth Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). Although the Court has
attempted to justify this distinction, the attempt is both flawed and incomplete. See generally Vicki C.
Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L.
REv. 1259 (2000) [hereinafter Jackson, Holistic Interpretation). The Ex parte Young exception also
presents problems. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court's New
Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 245, 265 (2000); see infra text accompanying notes 261-73, 288-316. I
address these issues in Part III.
6. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002) ("As a result,
the Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope of the States' sovereign immunity; it is but one
particular exemplification of that immunity."); Bd. ofTrs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
363 (2001) ("Although by its terms the Amendment applies only to suits against a State by citizens of
another State, our cases have extended the Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their
own States."); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) ("[W]e have made clear that the
Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against non consenting States."); Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 736 ( 1999) ("[T]he bare text of the Amendment is not an exhaustive description
of the States' constitutional immunity from suit."); Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669 (1999) ("Though its precise terms bar only federal jurisdiction over
suits brought against one State by citizens of another State or foreign state, we have long recognized that
the Eleventh Amendment accomplished much more: It repudiated the central premise . . . that the
jurisdictional heads of Article III superseded the sovereign immunity that the States possessed before
entering the Union."); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd. v. Coli. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 634-35
(1999) (quoting cases); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) ("The Court's
recognition of sovereign immunity has not been limited to the suits described in the text of the Eleventh
Amendment."); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54; Blatchford v. Native Viii., 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)
("[W)e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition ... which it confirms...."); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238
(1985) ("As we have recognized, the significance of this Amendment 'lies in its affirmation that the
fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art[icle) III' of the
Constitution.") (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984)); Nevada
v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,437 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The Eleventh Amendment is thus built on
the postulate that States are not, absent their consent, amenable to suit in the courts of sister States.");
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974) ("While the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits
against a State by its own citizens, this Court has consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune
from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.");
Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279,280
(1973) ("Although the Eleventh Amendment is not literally applicable since petitioners who brought suit
are citizens of Missouri, it is established that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in
federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State."); Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) ("Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the
words of [section) 2 of Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the
restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions
are postulates which limit and control."); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) ("[I)t has
become established by repeated decisions of this court that the entire judicial power granted by the
Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State
without consent given: not one brought by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a
foreign State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its own citizens,
because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification."); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. I, 12 (1890) (emphasizing the "force and meaning of the amendment"); In re Ayers,
123 U.S. 443, 505-06 (1887) ("To secure the manifest purposes of the constitutional exemption
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doctrine whose boundaries are both uncertain and the subject of
spirited debate among the members of the Court itself. 7 I join many
others in attempting to anticipate the Court's next turn,8 but the
overwhelming conclusion is that this federalism doctrine is mightily
confused. 9
The Court's "state regulatory immunity" doctrine has experienced
similar turbulence. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 10 the Court held that
Congress could constitutionally regulate a state just as it could

guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment, requires that it should be interpreted, not literally and too
narrowly, but fairly, and with such breadth and largeness as effectually to accomplish the substance of
its purpose.").
7. See, e.g., Alden, 521 U.S. at 761 (Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76-100
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 100-85 (Souter, J., dissenting); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247-302
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 778 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("Considered purely as constitutional text, these words--'constitutional design,' 'system of federalism,'
and 'plan of the convention'-suffer several defects. Their language is highly abstract, making them
difficult to apply. They invite differing interpretations at least as much as do the Constitution's own
broad liberty-protecting phrases, such as 'due process oflaw' or the word 'liberty' itself. And compared
to these latter phrases, they suffer the additional disadvantage that they do not actually appear anywhere
in the Constitution.").
8. I have argued that the Court currently envisions state sovereign immunity as inviolate to the
extent of the original Constitution but subject to abrogation pursuant to certain amendments, even those
antedating the Eleventh Amendment See generally Scott Dodson, 1he Metes and Bounds of State
Sovereign Immunity, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 721 (2002) [hereinafter Dodson, Metes & Bounds].
Others have joined this debate, especially with respect to the Treaty Clause. See, e.g., Susan Bandes,
Treaties, Sovereign Immunity, and "The Plan of the Convention." 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 743 (2002);
Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403 (2003);
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 713 (2002).
9. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURJSDICTION § 7.1 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that the
Court's Eleventh Amendment case law has been maligned as "tortuous" and "hodgepodge"); Dodson,
Metes & Bounds, supra note 8, at 723 ("No coherent theory of the applicable state sovereign immunity
readily arises from this bizarre quagmire."); Scott Fruehwald, 7he Principled and Unprincipled Grounds
of the New Federalism: A Call for Detachment in the Constitutional Adjudication of Federalism, 53
MERCER L. REv. 811, 836-63 (2002) (criticizing state sovereign immunity jurisprudence as
"unprincipled"); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, liS I-IARV.
L. REv. 1559, 1652-53 & nn.400-02 (2002) (citing scholarly criticism); Swaine, supra note 8, at 482
(stating that "it is hard to defend the Court's linedrawing based on any particular sovereignty-oriented
rationale"); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859,
859-61 (2000) (identifying two conflicting strains of justification for the Eleventh Amendment
doctrine). But see Daniel A. Farber, Pledging a New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the New
Federalism, 15 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1133, 1142 (2000) (seeing, though not wholeheartedly endorsing,
a coherent attempt to balance state sovereignty, federal supremacy, and individual rights in sovereign
immunity jurisprudence); William H. Pryor, Jr., Madison's Double Security: In Defense of Federalism,
the Separation of Powers, and the Rehnquist Court, 53 ALA. L. REv. 1167, 1169 (2002) ("The
jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court in matters offederalism is principled, coherent, and true to the text
and structure of the Constitution.").
10. 392 u.s. 183 (1968).
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regulate a private individual. 11 The Court partially overruled that
decision eight years later in National League of Cities v. Usery, 12
which held that Congress may not regulate states when its legislation
would intrude upon core state governmental functions that are
essential to a state's separate and independent existence. 13 However,
the Court did not clearly identify the constitutional source of this
limitation. 14 In City of Rome v. United States, 15 the Court carved out
an exception to National League of Cities for legislation authorized
by the Civil War Amendments.' 6 Further, in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 17 the Court reconsidered National
League of Cities and overruled it as unworkable. 18 Garcia relegated
protection of state sovereignty to the structural incorporation of state
interests in the procedural mechanisms of the federal government. 19
II. See id. at 196-97 ("[W]hile the commerce power has limits, valid general regulations of
commerce do not cease to be regulations of commerce because a State is involved. If a State is engaging
in economic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in by private
persons, the State too may be forced to conform its activities to federal regulation.").
12. 426 u.s. 833 (1976).
13. See id at 845. "We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they
are not within the authority granted Congress by (the Commerce Clause)." Jd at 852.
14. The Court was clear in defending the existence of affirmative constitutional limitations on
Congress' Article I powers. See id (''This Court has never doubted that there are limits upon the power
of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to
regulate commerce which are conferred by Art[icle] I of the Constitution."). The Court was far less clear
in identifYing the constitutional source of those affirmative limitations. See id. at 842 (citing the Tenth
Amendment as "an express declaration of this limitation" but then not mentioning the Tenth
Amendment or any constitutional provision thereafter).
IS. 446U.S.156(1980).
16. See id at 178--80. National League of Cities had left open this question. See Nat'/ League of
Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 n.l7 ("We express no view as to whether different results might obtain if
Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising authority granted it
under other sections of the Constitution such as the spending power, Art[icle] I, [section] 8, cl[ause] 1,
or [section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment'').
17. 469 u.s. 528 (1985).
18. /d. at531.
19. See id at 552. Others have used the terms differently than I do here. Perhaps the most common
use refers to the decision of a state court to look to either other state courts (horizontally) or to the
Court (vertically) for interpretive guidance. See STATE SUPREME COURTS xxi-xxii (M. C. Porter & G.
Alan Tarr eds., 1982); Stewart G. Pollack, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of
Balancing the &/ationships Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REv. 977, 992 (1985)
(defining horizontal federalism as federalism in which states look to each other for guidance). Professor
Lynn Baker has used the terms vertical or horizontal to refer to governmental aggrandizement. See Lynn
A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REv.
951, 9SS (2001) ("Vertical aggrandizement involves efforts by the federal government itself to increase
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Like the state sovereign immunity cases, the regulatory immunity
cases have been mercurial.
Other federalism doctrines, though less pockmarked by reversals,
are nonetheless notable for their controversial nature. In United States
v. Lopez,20 the Court found, for the first time since the New Deal, that
Congress had exceeded its authority to enact legislation pursuant to
the Commerce Clause? 1 The Court's recent anticommandeering
doctrine, which prevents Congress from directing the states to
administer or enforce federallaw, 22 has provoked bitter dissents 23 and
scholarly conflict. 24 To make matters more confusing, the Court first

its own power at the expense of the states, and may occur, for example, when the federal government
takes over regulatory functions traditionally exercised by the states, preempts sources of state revenue,
or imposes regulatory burdens on state government.... The important thing is that the impetus for the
expansion of federal power comes from the federal government itself or from interest groups operating
at the federal level, and not from state governmental institutions or geographically based interests
primarily concentrated at the state level. The second kind of threat to state autonomy, horizontal
aggrandizement, focuses on the differences among the states in their substantive policy preferences.
Here, the federal political process is the means by which a majority of states may impose their own
policy preferences on a minority of states with different preferences.").
20. 514 u.s. 549 (1995).
21. See id. at 551.
22. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 ( 1997) (holding invalid a statute directing the
activity of state and local officials); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) ("The
allocation of power contained in the Commerce Clause ... does not authorize Congress to regulate state
governments' regulation of interstate commerce.").
23. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 944 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There is not a clause, sentence, or
paragraph in the entire text of the Constitution of the United States that supports the proposition that a
local police officer can ignore a command contained in a statute enacted by Congress pursuant to an
express delegation of power enumerated in Article 1."); New York, 505 U.S. at 211 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The Tenth Amendment surely does not impose any limit on Congress' exercise of powers
delegated to it by Article I. Nor does the structure of the constitutional order or the values of federalism
mandate such a formal rule. To the contrary, the Federal Government directs state governments in many
realms.") (footnotes omitted); id. at 200 (White, J., dissenting) ("I fail to understand the reasoning
behind the Court's selective distinctions among the various aspects of sovereignty that may and may not
be waived and do not believe these distinctions will survive close analysis in future cases.").
24. Compare Evan H. Caminker, Stale Sovereignly and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1059-61, 1087-88 (1995)
[hereinafter Camiker, State Sovereignty] (rejecting a constitutional anticommandeering rule), and Martin
H. Redish, Doing II with Mi"ors: New York v. United States and Constitutional Limitations on Federal
Power to Require State Leigslation, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 593, 595-603 (1994) (same), with
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Ma~s
Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 831-47 (1998) (arguing for a
constitutional anticommandeering rule that would apply to executive branches of state governments),
and Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 19 VA. L. REv. 1957, 2033 (1993)
(rejecting a constitutional anticommandeering rule that would apply to executive branches of state
governments but accepting such a rule that would apply to state legislatures), and H. Jefferson Powell,

398

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

!Vol. 20:393

implied that the doctrine was grounded in the Tenth Amendment25
but subsequently disavowed reliance on that source. 26 What is clear
from these cases ts that the Court is struggling (perhaps
unsatisfactorily) to find a sound anchor for its federalism
jurisprudence. 27
The Court has admitted that "the task of ascertaining the
constitutional line between federal and state power has given rise to
many of the Court's most difficult and celebrated cases."28 The only
real guidance that the Court has offered in these federalism decisions
is that "our federalism requires that Congress treat these states in a
manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint
participants in the governance of the Nation."29
In this Article, I offer a new framework for understanding
federalism. "Vectoral federalism" engages directional metaphorshorizontal and vertical-to group various federalism doctrines
together into two principal groups. 30 Horizontal federalism concerns

The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 19 VA. L. REv. 633, 681-89 (1993) (arguing for a
prudential, though not constitutional, anticommandeering rule).
25. See New York, 505 U.S. at 155-57.
26. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (admitting that "no constitutional text speak[s] to this precise question'');
id. at 923 n.13 ("Th[e dissent's] argument also falsely presumes that the Tenth Amendment is the
exclusive textual source of protection for principles of federalism. Our system of dual sovereignty is
reflected in numerous constitutional provisions .... ").
27. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,656 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I add that
the majority's holding illustrates the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause
touchstone-a set of comprehensible interpretive rules that courts might use to impose some meaningful
limit, but not too great a limit, upon the scope of the legislative authority that the Commerce Clause
delegates to Congress."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(asserting that in questions of federalism "there seem to be much uncertainty respecting the existence,
and the content, of standards that allow the Judiciary to play a significant role in maintaining the design
contemplated by the Framers").
28. New York, 505 U.S. at ISS; accord Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
547 (1985) ("What has proved problematic is not the perception that the Constitution's federal structure
imposes limitations on the Commerce Clause, but rather the nature and content of those limitations.");
id. at 562 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("In National League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state
sovereignty as including 'traditional governmental functions,' a realm which is, of course, difficult to
define with precision.").
29. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999).
30. Others have used these terms differently. Perhaps the most common use refers to the decision of
a state court to look either to other state courts (horizontally) or to the Court (vertically) for interpretive
guidance. See STATE SUPREME COURTS xxi-xxii (M. C. Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982); Pollack,
supra note 19, at 992 (defining horizontal federalism as "federalism in which states look to each other
for guidance").
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the battle between the federal and the state governments for the
power to regulate individuals. Vertical federalism concerns the
federal government's power to regulate states and the states'
concomitant power to resist this regulation. Viewing federalism
doctrines as having vertical or horizontal vectors (or both) identifies
their common justifications and characteristics, which can assist in
understanding and in applying the principles of federalism. The
directional synthesis also illuminates and helps to rectify the Court's
errors. Vectoral federalism has the potential to become an important
tool for understanding American federalism and for developing a
more unified and coherent federalism doctrine.
I. NORMATIVE FEDERALISM

Because vectoral groupings are based in part on their normative
commonalities, a brief overview of federalism values is helpful to the
vectoral federalism discussion. The Constitution establishes a union
of "dual sovereignty between the states and the Federal
Govemment,"31 with federal sovereignty superior to that of the
states. 32 Federalism addresses how the states fit into their role as
participatory but unequal sovereigns.
Why did the Framers devise such a system? What seems clear is
that the sovereignty of the states has no independent or inherent
value; 33 rather, the real value of federalism lies in enhancing
democratic republicanism and reducing the risk of tyranny. 34 Thus,
31. Gregoryv.Ashcroft,SOl U.S.452,457(1991).
32. See id. at 460 ("The Federal Government holds a decided advantage in this delicate balance: the
Supremacy Clause. . . . As long as it is acting within the powers granted it under the Constitution,
Congress may impose its will on the States.").
33. See Coleman v. Thompson, SOl U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Federalism,
however, has no inherent normative value: It does not, as the majority appears to assume, blindly protect
the interests of States from any incursion by the federal courts. Rather, federalism secures to citizens the
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power."); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H.
Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1557 (2000);
Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE
L.J. 75, 135 (200 I).
34. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) ("[T)he Framers crafted the federal
system of Government so that the people's rights would be secured by the division of power.");
Gregory, SOl U.S. at 458 ("Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of
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the normative justifications for dual sovereignty depend upon its
enhancement of democracy and individualliberty. 3s
One justification for federalism is increased political diversity.
Under a system that permits a diverse group of decentralized
governments, citizens can develop (or move to) the government most
amenable to their needs or beliefs. 36 Diversity also permits states to
experiment with novel governmental matters. 37 A second justification
is that states should have primary responsibility for governing matters
in areas of historical and traditional state concern and also those in
which they have developed a special expertise. 38 A third justification
for federalism is the enhancement of responsive republicanism; the
most effective and responsive government is one in which the
representatives understand or at least have facile and ready access to
information concerning local problems and issues. 39 Federalism also
enhances citizen participation in the government by providing
government power.... [A] healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government
will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v.
Mississippi, 4S6 U.S. 742, 790 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("(O]ur
federal system provides a salutary check on governmental power.").
3S. I assume without comment the practical realities of these theories. For an empirical critique, see
Cross, supra note I.
36. See Baker & Young, supra note 33, at ISO ("[The] imposition of a uniform national solution
almost always will satisfy fewer people .... ");Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv.
317, 387 (1997) ("[D]ifferent governments can adopt a mix of policies that meet the preferences of
different citizens, thus maximizing the way in which government as a whole satisfies individual
preferences."); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8 (1988) (stating that federalism permits the citizens of "each
region [to] create the type of social and political climate they prefer"); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. PoL. ECON. 416 (19S6).
37. See United States v. LA:lpez, Sl4 U.S. S49, S83 (199S) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that a
statute that exceeds Congress' Commerce power "forecloses the States from experimenting and
exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of history and expertise");
Fed Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 4S6 U.S. at 788 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Courts and
commentators frequently have recognized that the SO States serve as laboratories for the development of
new social, economic, and political ideas."); New State lee Co. v. Liebmann, 28S U.S. 262,311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 87-90 (199S); Friedman,
supra note 36, at 397; Merritt, supra note 36, at 9.
38 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If Congress attempts that extension, then
at the least we must inquire whether the exercise of national power seeks to intrude upon an area of
traditional state concern."); Friedman, supra note 36, at401-02.
39. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971) (stating that a local referendum on a local
housing project "ensures that all the people of a community will have a voice in a decision which
[directly affects them]"); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 262-63 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1999).
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opportunities for aspiring local politicians to participate at the state
level. 40 Such involvement stimulates democratic representation,
improves the pool of interested representatives, and increases
accountability. 41 Finally, the dispersion of power has the additional
effect of providing a multi-layered government that increases the
avenues of citizen appeal. 42
Although these normative values provide support for various
federalism doctrines, 43 they are sub-constitutional norms. The
Constitution creates its own federalist structure, and it is in that
document that federalism becomes an indelible rule of governance.
Where the Constitution speaks to federalism, courts must enforce it.
Where the Constitution does not, federalism norms find vindication
only in judicially-devised rules of policy.
II. VECTORAL FEDERALISM

Although federalism is often discussed as a single, undifferentiated
term, not all federalism is the same. The different federalism
doctrines stem from different values and inexorably lead to different
applications. The various federalism forms roughly represent two
distinct concepts that lend themselves to vectoral metaphors.
"Horizontal federalism" addresses the struggles to define the separate
spheres of regulatory power of the states and the federal government.
"Vertical federalism" addresses the federal government's power to

40. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm 'n, 456 U.S. at 789 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("In addition to promoting experimentation, federalism enhances the opponunity of
all citizens to participate in representative government."); Friedman, supra note 36, at 389, 391; S.
Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civil Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 711 (1991).
41. See Friedman, supra note 36, at 395; Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 41 VAND. L.
REv. 1485, 1551-52 (1994); Merritt, supra note 36, at 7-8.
42. See Martha Minow, Putting Up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered, in COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM 77,96-99 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1990); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of
Federalism, 4 7 FLA. L. REV. 499, 538 (1995).
43. Most of the normative values actually result from the decentralization of power, rather than dual
sovereignty. See generally Cross, supra note 1 (arguing that replacing state government with
decentralized federal government would enhance federalism values); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm
Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 910-26 (1994)
(defining public participation, citizen choice, state competition, and experimentation as values of
decentralization, rather than of state sovereignty).
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regulate the states and the concomitant power of the states to resist
this regulation. Although not always clearly demarcated, these
federalism vectors illustrate a more coherent federalism doctrine.
A. Horizontal Federalism

Horizontal federalism addresses the states' role as participatory
sovereigns and concerns the scope and the boundaries of the powers
of the federal and of the state governments to regulate private parties.
The concept is somewhat quantitative-how much regulatory power
does each government have? The overriding principle of horizontal
federalism is a limited national government. The paradigmatic
question is this: "Which government-federal or state-has the
authority to regulate private conduct in this way?"44
1. Constitutional Underpinnings

Although the virtues of horizontal federalism are found in its
normative values, the authority to enforce it derives first and
foremost from the Constitution. Although the Constitution does not
mention "federalism," the text implicitly recognizes the continued
existence and viability of states as governments. The Constitution
provides for the physical territory of the states and gives the states a
voice in determining their boundaries;45 mandates state legislative,46
44. Some commentators use the tenn "separate sphere" federalism; the imagery is reminiscent of the
territoriality of the horizontal federalism discussed in this Article. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and
the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, Ill HARV. L. REv. 2180, 2196 (1998) [hereinafter
Jackson, Federalism].
45. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. I ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any
State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.").
46. See id art. I, § 2, cl. I ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen
every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."); id art I,§
8, cl. 17 (giving Congress the power "to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings"); id. art. II,§ I, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed
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executive, 47 and judicial48 existence m a republican form of
government;49 contemplates affirmative obligations in the federal
structure; 50 allows for state representation in the Article V
an Elector."); id. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union ...
protect[ion] ... against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic Violence."); id. art. V ("The Congress, whenever two
thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions
in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress ..
. ."); id. art. VI, § 3 ("The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the
several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the
several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test
shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.").
47. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 ("When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the
Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies."); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2
("A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and
be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled,
be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime."); id. art. IV, § 4 ("The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall
protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when
the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."); id art. VI, § 3 ("The Senators and
Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive
and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification
to any Office or public Trust under the United States."); id amend. XVII, § 2 ("When vacancies happen
in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of
election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive
thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature
may direct.").
48. See id. art. VI,§ 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."); id. art. VI, § 3 ("The
Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and
all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by
Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.").
49. See id. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government .... ").
50. See id art. II,§ I, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the
State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of
Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector."); id. art. VI, § 2 ("This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."); id. art. VI, § 3 ("The Senators and Representatives
before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial
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amendment process; 51 and erects a limited independence from federal
intrusion. 52
That the states exist as governmental entities, however, does not
inform the extent of their powers. The Constitution expressly, though
narrowly, limits the power of the states. States may not enter into
treaties, coin money, pass bills of attainder or ex post facto laws,
impair contracts, grant titles of nobility, tax imports or exports, keep
troops or ships of war, or engage in warfare. 53 States must also give
full faith and credit to the laws and privileges and immunities of other
states and extradite fugitives from the criminal process of other
states. 54 When it speaks to the states, the Constitution explicitly and
narrowly addresses their limits.
By contrast, when it speaks to the federal government, the
Constitution explicitly and narrowly grants powers. Congress has the
power to tax; to provide for the common defense and the general
welfare of the United States; to borrow money; to regulate
international, interstate, and Indian commerce; to establish
naturalization rules; to establish bankruptcy rules; to coin money; to
fix standard weights and measures; to provide for punishment for
Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to
support this Constitution .... ").
51. See id. art. V ("The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid
to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths
of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided ... that no State, without its Consent, shall be
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.").
52. See id. art. I,§ 3 ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
State, chosen by the Legislature thereof for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote."); id. art. I,
§ 4 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.").
53. See id. art I, § 10.
54. See id. art. IV, § I ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof."); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States."); id. art. IV,§ 2, cl. 2 ("A Person charged in any State with
Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on
Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to
the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.").
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counterfeiting; to establish the postal service; to provide copyright
and patent laws; to establish inferior federal courts; to punish piracy
and offenses against the law of nations; to declare war; to make rules
concerning hostile captures; to raise and support armies and a navy;
to govern the armed forces; to call for the militia; to govern the
capital territory; and to make all laws necessary and proper to these
ends. 55 The Senate and the President together have the power to make
treaties and appointments. 56 The President alone may wield the
executive power, 57 command the military, 58 and issue pardons. 59
Outside these enumerated powers (and even, under certain
circumstances, within them),60 the federal government lacks authority
to regulate. 61

55. Id. an. I, § 8.
56. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law .... ").
57. See id. art. II, § I, cl. 1.
58. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
59. See id.
60. Article I, section 9 imposes restrictions on the federal government: The federal government may
not unduly restrict interstate travel, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pass ex post facto
laws or bills of attainder, tax interstate exports, or award titles of nobility. See id. art. I, § 9. In addition,
the States have the power to appoint militia officers and train the militia. See id art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
61. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819) ("This government is
acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the
powers granted to it, would seem too apparent, to have required to be enforced by all those arguments,
which its enlightened friends, while it was depending before the people, found it necessary to urge; that
principle is now universally admitted."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The
powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or
forgotten, the (C)onstitution is written.").
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The obvious meaning of the explicit enumerations of federal power
and the explicit enumerations of the limits of state power in the
original Constitution implies that the states retain power over the
unenumerated areas of regulation and perhaps even concurrent power
over certain enumerated areas. 62 The Tenth Amendment confirms this
principle. 63
The balance of power in the system of dual sovereignty that the
original Constitution established has fluctuated with the enactment of
various amendments. As a historical matter, the Bill of Rights
initially protected state authority by limiting federal power to
intervene in state activities. 64 Prior to the Civil War, the states had
primary authority to regulate and define the civil rights of their
residents. 65 The Reconstruction Amendments clearly removed from
the states the power to regulate and define civil rights 66 by
prohibiting slavery, 67 racially-based voting restrictions,68 and

62. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 260 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) ("The powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are
to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite."); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 752 (1833) ("Being an instrument of limited and
enumerated powers, it follows irresistibly, that what is not conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the
state authorities .... ").
63. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
64. The first eight amendments originally granted the people various civil rights only in relation to
the federal government, not the state governments. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833);
see also, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (explicitly restricting Congress but nowhere mentioning the states).
Under its original meaning, the Bill of Rights created enclaves of state authority shielded from federal
intrusion. Thus, the First Amendment would not restrict Oregon from establishing a state church. The
federal government could not interfere with that action because the First Amendment prohibited the
making of any federal law respecting the establishment of religion. See Akhil Reed Amar, Hugo Black
and the Hall of Fame, 53 ALA. L. REv. 1221, 1223-24 (2002).
65. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 871 (1986) ("Prior to the Civil War, the states defined the status
and enforced the rights of the individual.").
66. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) ("[T]he substantive provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment ... embody significant limitations on state authority."); Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 346 (1879) ("The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and
they are to a degree restrictions of State power."); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological
Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, I CONST. COMMENT. 235, 276-77 (1984); Kaczorowski, supra
note 65.
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
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abridgment of the privileges and the immunities of national
citizenship, such as due process and equal protection of the law. 69 In
addition, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has
converted most of the Bill of Rights from protection of state power to
restrictions on state power. 70 The Eighteenth Amendment outlawed
liquor71 and gave concurrent power of enforcement to the state and
the federal governments. 72 The Twenty-First Amendment repealed
the Eighteenth Amendment73 and restored regulatory power over the
sale of liquor to the states. 74 The Voting Rights Amendments
restricted state power to define voting eligibility. 75
Although these amendments have altered the original boundaries
of state and federal power, the basic premise of horizontal federalism
remains unchanged: The Constitution establishes a system of dual
sovereignty with both the federal and the state governments directly
regulating private conduct within their respective but overlapping
68. See id. amend. XV, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.").
69. See id amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.").
70. See Amar, supra note 64; Dodson, Metes & Bounds, supra note 8, at 759-60.
71. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § I ("After one year from the ratification of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the
exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for
beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.").
72. /d. amend. XVIII, § 2 ("The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
73. See id amend. XXI,§ I ("The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United
States is hereby repealed.").
74. See id. amend. XXI, § 2 ("The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited.").
75. The Voting Rights Amendments prohibit voting discrimination on the basis of sex, see id.
amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."), the ability to pay poll taxes, see id. amend. XXIV, § 1 ("The right of citizens
of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors
for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax."), and
age, see id. amend. XXVI, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age
or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
age.").
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spheres. Thus, whether Congress may regulate a particular activity
depends on the sphere of that activity.
2. Horizontal Federalism in Action

Most clauses of positive or of negative power in the Constitution
are actual or potential battlefronts for horizontal federalism issues.
The Court's sinusoidal Commerce Clause jurisprudence is a
paradigmatic example. Under Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court
took an expansive view of this "great" federal power. 76 However,
later decisions that mirrored the Court's commitment to /aissez-faire
economics reflected a narrower interpretation of the commerce
power. 77 The Great Depression then prompted the Court to return to
an expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause to uphold New
Deal legislation. 78 Although a return to pre-New Deal days appears
unlikely, the Court has begun to apply the brakes. 79 In United States
v. Lopez80 and United States v. Morrison, 81 the Court struck down
Commerce Clause legislation as exceeding Congress' authority under
76. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 196 (1824) (proclaiming that the commerce
power "is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,
other than are prescribed in the constitution'); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407-24
(1819) (concluding that the Article I powers should be given a broad and flexible interpretation).
77. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 178 (1908) (refusing to recognize federal power
over local union activities with effects on interstate commerce); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. I, 12 (1895) (distinguishing commerce from manufacture); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. I, 20 (1888)
(same).
78. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. Ill, 125 (1942) (explaining that the Commerce Clause
applies to activities which are purely local and not commercial but which have a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) ("The power of
Congress ... extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of
the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a
legitimate end ...."); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I, 37 (1937) (departing from the
direct/indirect boundary of federal commerce power); Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. &
S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570-71 (1930) (permitting the exercise of the commerce power over railroad
union activities).
79. Unlike the other members of the current Court, however, Justice Thomas advocates a narrow
interpretation of the commerce power, as did the pre-New Deal Court. See United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
80. The legislation in Lopez criminalized the possession of a firearm in a school zone. Lopez, 5 14
u.s. at 551.
81. 514 U.S. 598 (1995). The legislation in Mo"ison created a federal cause of action for victims of
gender-related violence. /d. at 605.
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Article I. 82 Although the Court has recently tempered its decisions
that strike down federal laws by invoking the salutary effects of
federalism, 83 the Court has not answered a fundamental question that
underlies all of these cases: Where does federal power leave off and
exclusive state power begin?
Outside of the constitutional parameters of horizontal federalism,
normative values provide some justification for non-constitutional
judicial federalism doctrines. Perhaps the best examples are when a
federal authority has the constitutional power to act but declines to do
so because of normative federalism concerns. Both Congress and the
federal courts exercise such non-constitutional self-restraint.
One example of congressional self-restraint is Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 84 where the Court held that Congress did not intend the
diversity statute to extend federal jurisdiction to matters involving
custody disputes. 85 Although Congress could have vested the federal
courts with that jurisdiction, as authorized by Article III of the
Constitution, the Court reasoned that Congress had not done so in
part because of the state courts' traditional expertise in handling
custody issues. 86
The narrow grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts also reflects
the normative federalism underpinnings of dual sovereignty. These
concepts of federalism have given rise to judicially-created doctrines

82. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568.
83. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565 (arguing that an overbroad commerce power would enable the federal
government to mandate state primary educational curricula); id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Were
the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas
having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of
federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.").
84. 504 u.s. 689 (1992).
85. See id. at 703 ("[T)he domestic relations exception ... divests the federal courts of power to
issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees. Given the long passage of time without any
expression of congressional dissatisfaction, we ... reaffirmO the validity of the exception as it pertains
to divorce and alimony decrees and child custody orders.").
86. See id. at 704 ("As a matter of judicial economy, state courts are more eminently suited to work
of this type than are federal courts, which lack the close association with state and local government
organizations dedicated to handling issues that arise out of conflicts over divorce, alimony, and child
custody decrees. Moreover, as a matter of judicial expertise, it makes far more sense to retain the rule
that federal courts lack power to issue these types of decrees because of the special proficiency
developed by state tribunals over the past century and a half in handling issues that arise in the granting
of such decrees.").
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that manifest themselves as judicial self-restraint when state court
resolution would more likely further federalism norms than would
federal court resolution. The Burforcf1 abstention doctrine, for
example, counsels federal court withdrawal when a case presents
difficult questions of state law that bear on local policy matters
whose importance transcend the disposition of the case. 88
Abstention doctrines are often questions of horizontal federalism
that address which government should properly resolve an issue.
These questions arise not because the federal courts or Congress lack
the power to act, but because concern for federalism norms counsels
against federal action. Because the norms themselves are not
constitutional, however, judicial rules to decline jurisdiction are
defeasible by statute. After all, when Congress has the constitutional
authority to legislate, the courts have an unflagging obligation to
interpret that law. 89
3. Conclusion

The central question horizontal federalism asks is: "Which
government-state, federal, or both- has authority to regulate in this
area?" The answer is found in the structure of the Constitution as a
union of dual sovereigns and supported by normative justifications.
Where it is constitutional, the limitations of horizontal federalism are
not subject to waiver or consent. Where it is not constitutional, the
courts may erect abstention doctrines rooted in federalism norms
which may in turn be overridden by Congress.
B. Vertical Federalism

Unlike horizontal federalism, vertical federalism has little to do
with the two governments' respective spheres of power over

87. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
88. See id at 334; see also Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814
(1976).
89. See Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 813, 817 (explaining that abstention is "the exception, not the
rule[,)" because federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction
given them").
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individuals and everything to do with the power to regulate (or resist
regulation by) the other. In this respect, vertical federalism is
qualitative, rather than quantitative. Vertical federalism asks: How
strong is the federal government's power over the states, in what
forms can it be expressed, and when can the states resist? How
"unequal" are the two sovereigns? The concern here focuses on the
states' status as sovereign entities and what rights (as opposed to
regulatory powers) attend to that sovereignty.
1. Constitutional Underpinnings
a. The Federal Government's Constitutional Superiority

One of the most prominent differences between the Constitution
and the Articles of Confederation is the object of federal power. The
Articles of Confederation empowered the national government to
regulate the states but not the individuals. 90 The Framers deemed this
aspect unworkable, in part because they believed that a sufficiently
strong central government that could operate only on the states would
devolve into a military regime to enforce its will against the states.91
As a consequence, the Constitution instead enables direct national
regulation of individuals. 92
However, the Constitution's focus on individual regulation does
not necessarily prohibit regulation of the states. 93 To the contrary, the
90. See ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. IX.
91. See GoRDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-87, 471-75 (1969);
THE FEDERALIST No. 16, at 81-86 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
92. See I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 133 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)
(James Madison) ("Under the existing Confederacy, Cong[ress] represent[s] the States not the people of
the States: their acts operate upon the States not on the individuals. The case will be changed in the new
plan of Gov[ernment).") [hereinafter RECORDS); see also Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 791 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The principal defect of the Articles
of Confederation, 18th-century writers agreed, was that the new National Government lacked the power
to compel individual action .... The Constitution cured this defect by permitting direct contact between
the National Government and the individual citizen .... ").
93. The Court has on occasion gone to great lengths to attempt to prove that the Constitution was
meant to prevent the federal government from acting directly on the states. See Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163-66 (1992); Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm 'n, 456 U.S. at 791-96 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court's
analysis leaves a logical gap unfilled. Nothing in the Court's argument supports the conclusion that the
Constitution prohibits the federal government from regulating the states. See New York, 505 U.S. at 163-
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Constitution leaves undefined the objects of the exercise of its grants
of power, thus implicitly permitting regulation of both individuals
and states. Moreover, because the Articles of Confederation
specifically limited the national power to operating on the states, and
because the Constitution was designed to augment national power,
one can assume that the Constitution was not designed to withhold all
regulation of the states, a power imparted to the federal government
by the inferior Articles. 94 In addition, evidence exists that the Framers
believed it to be within the power of the federal government to
regulate the states. 95
There are also concrete expressions of federal superiority. The
Supremacy Clause of Article VI assures the supremacy of federal
law, the Constitution, and treaties, and binds state judges to federal
strictures. 96 Article III gives federal courts jurisdiction to issue orders
adverse to, and binding upon, states.97 The Habeas Corpus Clause
66; id at 210 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Nothing in th[e] history [of ratification] suggests that the Federal
Government may not also impose its will upon the several States as it did under the Articles."). Indeed,
powerful arguments exist to the contrary. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 941-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(marshalling evidence supporting federal commandeering powers).
94. See THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (asserting
that because limiting the exercise of federal power to states was ineffective under the Articles, "we must
extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens") (emphasis added); id. No. 27, at 144
(Alexander Hamilton) (interpreting the Constitution to "enable the [national] government to employ the
ordinary magistracy of each [state) in the execution of its laws" "by extending the authority of the
federal head to the individual citizens of the several States") (emphasis added).
95. See id No. IS, at 76 (Alexander Hamilton); id. No. 27, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Thus the
legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the [states] will be incorporated into the operations of the
national government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered
auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws."); id. No. 36, at 187 (Alexander Hamilton) (predicting that the
federal government would conscript state officers to collect federal taxes); id No. 45, at 260 (James
Madison) (intimating extended roles for state officials and stating that it was "extremely probable that in
other instances, particularly in the organization of the judicial power, the officers of the States will be
clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union"); cf Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I
Wheat.) 304,343 (1816) ("It is a mistake that the [C]onstitution was not designed to operate upon states,
in their corporate capacities."); WOOD, supra note 91, at 474 (stating that John Jay envisioned the states
being to the national government as the counties were to the states); id at 525 (asserting that the
Federalists intended the Constitution to "prostrate" and "nearly annihilate" the states to a point of
existence dependent upon their usefulness).
96. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
97. See id. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
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ensures the availability of federal habeas corpus relief to state
detainees. 98 Finally, the Spending Clause enables Congress to
purchase state compliance with its directives. 99
In addition, the states have seen some attrition of their sovereign
status since the Civil War. The great shifts in federal-state power
after the Civil War gave Congress the power to enforce the
provlSlons of the Reconstruction Amendments (and other
constitutional provisions incorporated through the Due Process
Clause) against the states. 100 The Voting Rights Amendments
similarly empower Congress to enforce their strictures on the
states. 101
Thus, the Constitution directs that federal law is supreme to state
law, that the federal courts can exercise jurisdiction over the states
and issue orders compelling them to act, that Congress can regulate
the states pursuant to its Article I powers, and that Congress can
enforce the provisions of certain amendments against the states. The
next question is whether, and to what extent, the states can resist
those exercises of power.
b. The States' Power to Resist

In contrast to horizontal demarcations and federal supremacy
vectors, broad state resistance vectors lack clear textual support in the

their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to
Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between
Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."); id.
(giving the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in all cases "in which a State shall be Party").
98. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
99. See id art. I, § 8, cl. I ("The Congress shall have Power To ... provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States ...."); accord Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. I, 17 (1981) (permitting Congress to "fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal money to
the States").
100. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII,§ 2; id. amend. XIV,§ 5; id amend. XV,§ 2.
I 0 I. See id. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation."); id amend. XXIV, § 2 ("The Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation."); id. amend. XXVI, § 2 (same).
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Constitution. 102 There are at least three constitutional sources for state
resistance to federal authority over the states. First, the Eleventh
Amendment precludes the exercise of federal court jurisdiction over
suits brought against a state by citizens of a different state or by
citizens of foreign states. 103 This provision is a clear and direct,
though narrow, constitutional shield against the exercise of federal
authority over the states.
Second, the Constitution implicitly contemplates the continued
existence of state government. 104 One reasonable inference is that the
Constitution prohibits any federal intrusion into state affairs which in
effect destroys the governmental character of the states. Take the
fiscal integrity of the states, for example. States cannot "simply go
out of business" or declare bankruptcy or limit fiscal matters to
profitable or risk-adverse investments. 105 A real need exists to
maintain the states as viable political entities that cannot be
completely left to the will of Congress. 106 The Constitution implicitly
prohibits the federal government from eliminating the states as
states. 107

I 02. Indeed, it is either evidence of the clear distinction between vertical and horizontal federalism or
evidence of a severe case of schizophrenia that the Court resons to constitutional text in its newest
horizontal federalism cases, yet disparages strict constructionism in its vertical federalism cases.
Compare United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552-53 (1995) (focusing on the language of the
Commerce Clause), with supra notes 5, 13, and 22 (citing vertical federalism cases disavowing reliance
on text).
103. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
I 04. See supra text accompanying notes 45-52.
I 05. Althouse, supra note 5, at 266.
106. See id.
107. See Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926) (observing that "neither government
may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial manner the exercise of its powers"); Texas v. White,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869), overruled by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885) ("[T)he
preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and
care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National
government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of
indestructible States."); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868) ("[T]he people of each
State compose a State, having its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to
separate and independent existence .... [I]n many articles of the Constitution the necessary existence of
the States, and, within their proper spheres, the independent authority of the States, is distinctly
recognized.").
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Third, state sovereignty and its attendant attributes may provide
support for state resistance. 108 Nowhere does the Constitution
mention state sovereignty, much less define what attributes of
sovereignty the states retained upon ratification. 109 Perhaps those who
framed the Constitution meant to reject English notions of
governmental sovereignty and build a new framework on popular
sovereignty instead. 110 Perhaps the Framers assumed the existence of
state sovereignty and the retention of certain attributes and felt no
need to include them in the Constitution. Assuming that the states
hold at least some degree of sovereignty, 111 it is an open-and
difficult--question just how much sovereignty (or what attributes)
they hold. 112
Proponents of state sovereignty might look to the Tenth
Amendment, which reserves to the states those "powers not
delegated" to the federal government. 113 This confirmation is clearly
tautological, however, offering no more to the states than the balance
I 08. Perhaps state sovereignty is actually the only source of state resistance, and the other tw(}-the
Eleventh Amendment and the constitutional guarantees of state existence--are merely expressions of it.
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) ("If the principle of representative government is to be
preserved to the States, the balance between competing interests must be reached after deliberation by
the political process established by the citizens of the State, not by judicial decree mandated by the
Federal Government and invoked by the private citizen."); id at 750 ("Private suits against
non consenting States-especially suits for money damages-may threaten the financial integrity of the
States."); id. at 750-51 ("A general federal power to authorize private suits for money damages would
place unwarranted strain on the States' ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens.");
Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1994) ("The principle of immunity from litigation
assures the states and the nation from unanticipated intervention in the processes of government .... ");
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,471 (1793) (Jay, C.J.) (explaining that sovereignty is the right
to govern).
109. See Jackson, Federalism, supra note 44, at 2215 (observing that states' rights do not clearly
appear in the Constitution's text); Jean Yarbrough, Federalism and Rights in the American Founding, in
FEDERALISM AND RIGHTS 57, 64 (Ellis Katz & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1996) (explaining that the
Constitution does not empower states with anything "inviolable" and instead constrains state power).
110. See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 19-24 (1996); WOOD, supra note 91,
at 530; see also Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 453-66 (Wilson, J.); id. at 473 (Jay, C.J.).
111. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 213 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)
(asserting that the states retained a "residuary and inviolable sovereignty"); WOOD, supra note 91, at
530-31, 545-46 (explaining that the people, as ultimate sovereigns, could doll out sovereign power to
state or national governments as they wished).
112. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. I, 33 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What is subject to greater dispute, however, is how
much sovereign immunity was implicitly eliminated by what Hamilton called the 'plan of the
convention."').
113. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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of what the Constitution does not grant to the federal governrnent. 114
The drafters of the Tenth Amendment had the opportunity to further
limit federal power, particularly that contained in the Necessary and
Proper Clause, by inserting the word "expressly" in the phrase "not
delegated" to reflect the predecessor phrase in the Articles of
Confederation. 115 Nevertheless, the drafters repeatedly refused to
include the term "expressly," 116 in large part because they intended
the Tenth Amendment to be no more than tautological. 117 Thus, the
Tenth Amendment has been held to be no bar to the appropriate
exercise of the power granted in Article I. 118
Comparison of the Tenth Amendment to its predecessor in the
Articles of Confederation provides even less help to sovereignty
issues. The Articles ensured that "[e]ach state retains its sovereignty,
114. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,942 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Amendment
confirms the principle that the powers of the Federal Government are limited to those affirmatively
granted by the Constitution, but it does not purport to limit the scope of the effectiveness of the exercise
of powers that are delegated to Congress."); New York v. United States, SOS U.S. 144, 211 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Tenth Amendment surely does not impose any limit on Congress'
exercise of the powers delegated to it by Article I. Nor does the structure of the constitutional order or
the values of federalism mandate such a formal rule. To the contrary, the Federal Government directs
state governments in many realms.") (footnotes omitted); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
858 (1976), averru/ed by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("But there is no restraint based on state sovereignty requiring or permitting judicial
enforcement anywhere expressed in the Constitution .... "); id. at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than
declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it had been established by
the Constitution before the amendment ...."). But see EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,270-74 (1983)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Framers originally intended for principles of state sovereignty
to control the enumerated powers).
liS. Compare U.S. CONST. amend X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."),
with ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. II ("Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence,
and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the
United States, in Congress assembled.") (emphasis added).
116. See 3 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY & WILLIAM JEFFREY, JR., POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 36 ( 1980).
117. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 790 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (James Madison) (explaining that the
term "expressly" was excluded because "it was impossible to confine a Government to the exercise of
express powers; there must necessarily be admitted powers by implication, unless the [C]onstitution
descended to recount every minutia").
118. See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947) ("[T)he Tenth
Amendment has been consistently construed 'as not depriving the national government of authority to
resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the
permitted end."' (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).
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freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right,
which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United
States, in Congress assembled." 119 When the concept was codified in
the Tenth Amendment, only state "powers" were reserved (and even
then to be shared by the people); nothing about state sovereignty,
freedom, independence, jurisdiction, or rights survived to the
Constitution. 120 The Tenth Amendment, therefore, does not help
resolve any sovereignty questions.
The Eleventh Amendment, which confirms that the judicial power
of Article III is limited with respect to certain private suits against
states, 121 may support a broad codification of inviolable state
sovereignty. One attribute of sovereignty is sovereign dignity. 122 One
could argue that a state's sovereign dignity (assuming that the states
retained this attribute after ratification) is unacceptably impinged
when the state is haled into court at the insistence of a private
plaintiff. 123 This is a course that the Court has accepted-and even
119. ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. II.
120. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."). Furthermore,
"rights" are afforded to the people, not to states. See Dodson, Metes & Bounds, supra note 8, at 749
n.l44.
121. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
122. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 96 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[l)t might have
been unseemly to allow a commoner to hale the monarch into court."). There are other sovereign
immunity justifications besides sovereign dignity. See, e.g., id at 95 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410,415 n.7 (1979) ("The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even
of thinking wrong; he can never mean to do an improper thing[.)" (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 246)); Hall, 440 U.S. at 414-15 (explaining sovereign immunity on the basis that no
tribunal could be higher than the King). However, the colonists rejected these justifications. See THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("The history of the present King of Great Britain
is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an
absolute Tyranny over these States.").
123. See, e.g., 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 429 (Herbert Storing ed., 1981) (Brutus) ("It is
improper, because it subjects a state to answer in a court of law, to the suit of an individual. This is
humiliating and degrading to a government, and, what I believe, the supreme authority of no state ever
submitted to.") (footnote omitted); FEDERAL FARMER, OBSERVATIONS LEADING TO A FAIR
EXAMINATION OF THE SYSTEM OF GoVERNMENT PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION; AND TO
SEVERAL ESSENTIAL AND NECESSARY ALTERATIONS IN IT. IN A NUMBER OF LETTERS FROM THE
FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN (1788), reprinted in 14 THE DocUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, at 41-42 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspere J. Saladino eds., 1983)
("How far it may be proper so to humble a state, as to bring it to answer to an individual in a court of
law is worthy of consideration . . . . ") (footnote omitted); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487
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expanded 124-leaving the actual prohibitions of the Eleventh
Amendment swallowed by the much broader effect of state dignity. 125
There are highly persuasive arguments against this constitutional
interpretation. 126 Nevertheless, assummg the validity of this
interpretation, only a single limited conclusion follows: The
Constitution implicitly recognizes the sovereignty of the states, one
part of which is powerful enough to resist a state appearing as a
defendant in federal court at the whim of a private plaintiff. It says
nothing about what other attempts to encroach on state sovereignty
might or might not succeed.

(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) ("It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.").
124. See Scott Dodson, Dignity: The New Frontier of State Sovereignty, 56 OKLA. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Dodson, Dignity).
125. See supra note 6.
126. First, the Eleventh Amendment, like the Tenth, nowhere mentions state sovereignty or dignity.
See U.S. CONST. amends. X, XI. Second, the Eleventh Amendment only restricts a very narrow class of
suits, those brought by citizens of a different state or by citizens or subjects of a foreign state. See U.S.
CoNST. amend. XI. Third, ample historical evidence suggests that the real reason for the Eleventh
Amendment was narrow and practical-to protect the financial viability of the states from creditors. See
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821) ("There was not much reason to fear that
foreign or sister States would be creditors to any considerable amount, and there was reason to retain the
jurisdiction of the Court in those cases, because it might be essential to the preservation of peace. The
amendment, therefore, extended to suits commenced or prosecuted by individuals, but not to those
brought by States."). Had the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment really sought to protect the broad
principle of state sovereign dignity, they surely would have worded the Amendment differently. See
Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743,771-72 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If
the paramount concern of the Eleventh Amendment's framers had been protecting the so-called 'dignity'
interest of the States, surely Congress would have endorsed the first proposed amendment granting the
States immunity from process, rather than the later proposal that merely delineates the subject matter
jurisdiction of courts."). Commentators and jurists have derided the dignity rationale. See, e.g., id. at
770-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 802-03 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("It would be hard to imagine anything more inimical to the republican conception, which rests on the
understanding of its citizens precisely that the government is not above them, but of them, its actions
being governed by law just like their own. Whatever justification there may be for an American
government's immunity from private suit, it is not dignity."); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 96-97
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cohens, 19 U.S. at 406-07); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf
& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 151 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (lambasting the justification as
"embarrassingly insufficient"); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 315 (1904) ("That (the
Eleventh Amendment's] motive was not to maintain the sovereignty of a State from the degradation
supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the nation, may be inferred from the
terms of the amendment. ... We must ascribe the amendment, then, to some other cause than the dignity
of a State."). See generally Dodson, Dignity, supra note 124 (concluding that the dignity rationale lacks
grounding in the Constitution, history, or conclusive precedent).
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Thus, these boundaries are left to the federal courts to draw in
consideration ofcomity, 121 respect for another sovereign's dignity, 128
and respect for another sovereign's right to govern. 129 The first is
difficult to justify with normative values, but two federalism norms
help courts draw boundaries with respect to the second. The more
autonomous and independent the states are from federal control, the
better the political accountability of each. 130 The continued existence
of two separate and independent sovereignties also reduces the
likelihood that the benefits of decentralization will be overcome. 131
Strictly read, the Constitution at most creates a narrow
jurisdictional bar to suits against states, guarantees the existence of
the states as independent and functioning governmental entities, and
implicitly recognizes their sovereign status. While the first two are
quite narrow, the Constitution does not define the extent or strength
of the third. In that respect, the courts must weigh the supremacy
powers of the federal government against their impingement on the
states' sovereignty.

127. See, e.g., Hall, 440 U.S. at 416 ("[Immunity] must be found either in an agreement, express or
implied, between the two sovereigns, or in the voluntary decision of the second to respect the dignity of
the first as a matter of comity."). The comity rationale was recently tested by several states who urged
the Court to overrule Hall. See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Fla et al., Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v.
Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. 1683 (2003) (No. 02-42). The Court declined to do so. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v.
Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. 1683 (2003).
128. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 416.
129. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,472 (1972) (Jay, C.J.).
130. See, e.g., Carninker, supra note 24, at 1060-61 (explaining that federal commandeering of the
states may blur political accountability lines); id. at 1076-79 (arguing that commandeering is no more in
furtherance of tyranny than constitutional preemption); Jackson, Federalism, supra note 44, at 2202
("Conditional spending regulatory requirements, though nominally involving a state's choice to accept
federal funds, can result in a very confusing picture of responsibility for voters.").
131. See supra text accompanying notes 34-42. But see Caminker, supra note 24, at 1075 ("But here
it is really constitutional limitations on Congress'O authority, not the sovereignty of states, that does the
work of restraining tyrannical power.") (footnotes omitted).
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2. Vertical Federalism in Action
There are several different federalism doctrines with vertical
vectors: state sovereign immunity, state regulatory immunity,
anticommandeering, and Ex parte Young are just a few. State
sovereign immunity questions ask whether a state's sovereign dignity
vector can repel vectors of federal power. In most cases, the answer
hinges on a test that balances the indignity to the state and the need
for vindication of federal superiority. On this balance, the powers in
Article I cannot outweigh sovereign dignity, but the powers of the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can, because the
Fourteenth Amendment was specifically designed to enable federal
encroachment on state sovereignty. 132 In a different context, dignity
protects the sovereign itself, but the need to enforce federal law
requires that federal courts permit suits against state officers for
injunctive relief.
State regulatory immunity allows a state to resist federal regulation
of certain functions. The vertical federalism struggle pits the
enforcement of legitimate federal goals against the continued
existence of states as governments. Thus, Congress may regulate
states if its legislation incidentally affects core state governmental
functions 133 but may not, for example, condition a state's admission
into the Union on the locality of the state capital. 134
The anticommandeering cases illustrate a third vertical federalism
doctrine. These cases deal with resolving state attempts to resist
federal mandates directed at state governmental mechanisms. The
commandeering cases ask whether federal supremacy can override
the states' dignity and the constitutional guarantee of their
autonomous governmental existence. For example, the federal
government may direct state agencies to consider certain federal
132. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,456 (1976).
133. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-57 (1985) (holding that
affording state employees the protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act did not exceed any
constitutional limitation); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 200 (1968), overruled by Nat'l League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555-57.
134. See Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911) (asserting that the states of the Union are
"equal in power, dignity and authority, each competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution itself').
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standards in their ratemak.ing functions, 135 but may not compel state
legislatures to enact affirmative legislation 136 or state officials to
execute federal mandates. 137
Ex parte Young 138 is an exception to state sovereign immunity that
allows suits against state officers for violations of federal law. 139 The
doctrine balances the sovereign immunity of the states with the need
for some enforcement of federal mandates. 140 Under Ex parte Young,
sovereign immunity applies when the state is the "real, substantial
party in interest[,]" 141 such as when a retrospective money judgment
would operate against the state. 142 Ex parte Young, however, permits
suits for prospective injunctive relief. 143 The retrospective/
prospective distinction thus strikes a balance between the sovereignty
of the states and the importance of compliance with federallaw. 144
These vertical federalism examples have similar characteristics.
All involve a measure of direct federal power over the states and an
opposing state power of resistance. The opposing state power stems
from state sovereignty and manifests itself either in the constitutional
135. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,765-66 (1982).
136. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
137. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,935 (1997).
138. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
139. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).
140. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 747 (1999) ("(Young] is based in part on the premise that
sovereign immunity bars relief against States and their officers in both state and federal courts, and that
certain suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers must therefore be permitted if the
Constitution is to remain the supreme law of the land."); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)
("Both prospective and retrospective relief implicate Eleventh Amendment concerns, but the availability
of prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause.
Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal
interest in assuring the supremacy of that law."); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 1OS (1984) ("[T]he Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to
vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible .... ");Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 106
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) ("Ex parte Young was the culmination of efforts by this
Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights
and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution.").
141. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459,464
(1945)).
142. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974); Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963)
(per curiam).
143. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664.
144. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106 ("In sum, Edelman's distinction between prospective and
retroactive relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving to
an important degree the constitutional immunity of the States.").
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guarantee of state sovereign existence, the unmentioned attribute of
state sovereign dignity, or comity.
C. A Caveat

As with many "rules" of law and political theory, the distinction
between horizontal and vertical federalism is not immaculate.
Mechanisms of horizontal federalism often exhibit vertical vectors,
and mechanisms of vertical federalism often exhibit horizontal
vectors. A particular federalism doctrine might appear to have a
diagonal vector-a vector exhibiting both horizontal and vertical
influences simultaneously. In most cases, however, the doctrine's
horizontal and vertical components can be recognized and
distinguished.
Take, for example, Congress' power under the Spending Clause. 145
The Spending Clause permits federal regulation of private conduct in
areas outside of Congress' enumerated powers. 146 This is a question
of horizontal federalism. Spending Clause legislation can also be
used to purchase regulatory power over the states. 147 This is a
question of vertical federalism. The mere fact that Spending Clause
legislation does not fall wholesale into one category or the other is
not particularly problematic. Once a particular piece of Spending
Clause legislation is identified as having horizontal or vertical
vectors, the vectors can be analyzed piecemeal.
Similarly, certain abstention doctrines exhibit attributes of
horizontal federalism; they need not fall exclusively within that
category. For example, the Younger 148 abstention doctrine operates to
prevent federal court interference with pending state court

145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I.
146. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (affinning Congress' ability under the
Spending Clause to regulate matters expressly reserved to the states under the Twenty-First
Amendment); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947) (holding that
the Tenth Amendment does not bar Spending Clause legislation otherwise authorized by Article 1).
147. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (stating that Congress has the authority and
the means to seek a state's voluntary consent to private suits).
148. Youngerv.Harris,401 U.S.37(1971).
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proceedings. 149 The rationale for this type of abstention was grounded
in part on the vertical federalism concern for the need for
independent state governmental functions. 150
This Article does not attempt to prove that every governmental
action touching upon federalism concerns can be divided into
horizontal or vertical federalism categories with exact precision. 151
To the contrary, the directional metaphors apply to the characteristics
of the various federalism doctrines, not necessarily to the doctrines
themselves! 52 The vertical and the horizontal vectors are different
because they generally have different bases and different
considerations. The federalism doctrines discussed in the following
section have strong vectors in one particular direction. Thinking
vectorally can illuminate their parallel or divergent parameters and
characteristics.

149. See id. at 41 ("(W]e have concluded that the judgment of the District Court, enjoining appellant
Younger from prosecuting under these California statutes, must be reversed as a violation of the national
policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special
circumstances."). Although Younger was a criminal proceeding, the Younger abstention doctrine has
been extended to prohibit interference in state civil proceedings as well. See Middlesex County Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton
Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619,627 (1986); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. I, II (1987).
150. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45 ("This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from
interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of
'comity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is
referred to by many as 'Our Federalism,' and one familiar with the profound debates that ushered our
Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams
of 'Our Federalism.' The concept does not mean blind deference to 'States' Rights' any more than it
means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts.
The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which there is
sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National
Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests,
always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the
States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, 'Our Federalism,' born in the early struggling days
of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation's history and its future.").
151. Preemption is a particularly difficult example. Although primarily concerned with the regulation
of individuals, a horizontal federalism trait, preemption has the effect of displacing state regulatory
power under the authority of the Supremacy Clause, a vertical federalism power.
152. The Fourteenth Amendment is a prime example. See supra text accompanying notes 288-315.
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Ill. A VECTORAL FEDERALISM CRITIQUE OF CURRENT
FEDERALISM DOCTRINES

Applying vectoral federalism to the Court's various federalism
doctrines has two effects. It helps explain and support certain aspects
of the doctrines, such as those in the Court's Commerce Clause and
state sovereign immunity jurisprudence. With respect to other
federalism doctrines, such as anticommandeering and regulatory
immunity, vectoral federalism suggests that the Court has seriously
misconceived its position. Overall, viewing federalism from a
vectoral standpoint helps to form a more coherent and unified
federalism doctrine. 153
A. State Sovereign Immunity

For the most part, viewing state sovereign immunity issues as
questions of vertical federalism helps to explain a great deal about the
Court's jurisprudence. Nevertheless, it also raises some questions for
the future.
The Court has become increasingly bolder in invoking the dignity
justification for state sovereign immunity. 154 Perhaps this trend is due
in part to the realization that the Tenth Amendment cannot be the
source of state sovereign immunity because that Amendment speaks
only in confirmation of horizontal federalism principles. 155 Thus, the
153. One recent court of appeals case, Hoodv. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp., 319 F.3d 756 (6th Cir.
2003), is a paradigmatic example of confusion between horizontal and vertical federalism. There, the
Sixth Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I permitted congressional abrogation of state
sovereign immunity because it provided Congress with exclusive regulatory power to establish uniform
bankruptcy laws. See ld. at 761-62. An exclusive regulatory power does not necessarily include the
power to abrogate. See supra note 4; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996). One reason is
that the battle for regulatory power and needs for uniformity are horizontal queries, while the
applicability of state sovereign immunity is vertical. Hood obfuscates this critical distinction by treating
horizontal and vertical federalism as one doctrine. See Dodson, Metes & Bounds, supra note 8, at 74446. Use of federalism vectors might have avoided further confusion.
154. See supra note 124.
155. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 767 n.l8 (2002) ("The principle
of state sovereign immunity enshrined in our constitutional framework, however, is not rooted in the
Tenth Amendment."); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 761 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("There is no
evidence that the Tenth Amendment constitutionalized a concept of sovereign immunity as inherent in
the notion of statehood .... ").
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Court has looked elsewher~utside the Constitution's bare
language.
Accepting the Court's premise that the Constitution's structure
protects state sovereign dignity, its sovereign immunity decisions
make some coherent sense. If the Constitution leaves intact the
dignity inherent in state sovereignty, then the default position is that
dignity immunizes the states from suit, and the only question is
whether other circumstances so justify federal supremacy that state
dignity must yield. The Court has often declined to find a need for
subjecting the states to suit because other means of ensuring state
compliance with federal law exist. 156 Examples include the good faith
of the states to abide by the law, 157 voluntary consent, 158 induced
waiver, 159 the federal government's ability to sue for enforcement, 160
section 5 private enforcement, 161 suits brought by the other states,
suits against local governments, 162 and suits against state officers. 163
The dignity rationale provides some support for vindicating state
sovereign immunity in suits by private parties in a state's own
courts 164 or before federal administrative tribunals. 165 The need to
vindicate federal rights is not dependent on the forum, and private
suits impair state sovereignty regardless of the forum. Indeed,
subjecting a nonconsenting state to suit in its own courts may offend
its dignity to an even greater extent because it essentially coerces the
state to sanction itself, if necessary. 166 Imposing jurisdiction on a
156. See Alden, 521 U.S. at 755.
157. See id. ("We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the
bin~ing laws of the United States.").
I 58. See id. ("Many States, on their own initiative, have enacted statutes consenting to a wide variety
of suits."); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944) (proclaiming that immunity is
"mitigated by a sense of justice which has continually expanded by consent the suability of the
sovereign").
159. See Alden, 521 U.S. at 755 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).
160. See id.
161. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 421 U.S. 445,456 (1976).
162. See Mt Healthy City Sch. Dist Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 214, 280 (1977); Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 ( 1890).
163. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 755-57; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,71 n.l4 (1996).
164. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 749.
165. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002).
166. Note how the two vertical federalism doctrines of sovereign immunity and anticommandeering
tend to merge here. See Alden, 521 U.S. at 749 ("In some ways, of course, a congressional power to
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nonconsenting state in a federal administrative proceeding may also
be a more serious affront than a suit in an Article III court. 167
Accordingly, it is consistent with the dignity rationale to uphold state
sovereign immunity in suits brought by private parties regardless of
the forum.
There are two circumstances in which the Court has recognized
that states lack sovereign immunity: suits brought by another state
and suits brought by the federal government. These party-based
exceptions are consistent with vertical federalism considerations
because they weigh the need for federal superiority against the states'
interest in immunity. State sovereign dignity still exists and such suits
may infringe upon it, but perhaps to a lesser degree than in a suit
brought by a private party for two reasons. First, the plaintiff is at
least a coequal sovereign. 168 Second, the plaintiff is presumed to be

authorize private suits against nonconsenting States in their own courts would be even more offensive to
state sovereignty than a power to authorize the suits in a federal forum. Although the immunity of one
sovereign in the courts of another has often depended in part on comity or agreement, the immunity of a
sovereign in its own courts has always been understood to be within the sole control of the sovereign
itself. A power to press a State's own courts into federal service to coerce the other branches of the
State, furthermore, is the power first to tum the State against itself and ultimately to commandeer the
entire political machinery of the State against its will and at the behest of individuals. Such plenary
federal control of state governmental processes denigrates the separate sovereignty of the States.")
(citations omitted).
167. See Fed. Mar. Comm 'n, 535 U.S. at 760 ("Simply put, if the Framers thought it an impermissible
affront to a State's dignity to be required to answer the complaints of private parties in federal courts, we
cannot imagine that they would have found it acceptable to compel a State to do exactly the same thing
before the administrative tribunal of an agency, such as the FMC .... The affront to a State's dignity
does not lessen when an adjudication takes place in an administrative tribunal as opposed to an Article
Ill court. In both instances, a State is required to defend itself in an adversarial proceeding against a
private party before an impartial federal officer.") (footnotes omitted); id. at 760 n.ll ("One, in fact,
could argue that allowing a private party to haul a State in front of such an administrative tribunal
constitutes a greater insult to a State's dignity than requiring a State to appear in an Article III court
presided over by a judge with life tenure nominated by the President of the United States and confirmed
by the United States Senate.'').
168. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892) ("Texas is not called to the bar of this court
at the suit of an individual, but at the suit of the government established for the common and equal
benefit of the people of all the States. The submission to judicial solution of controversies arising
between these two governments, 'each sovereign,' ... but both subject to the supreme law of the land,
does no violence to the inherent nature of sovereignty." (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 400,410 (1819))); see also Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 514
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 81, 84 (2001) [hereinafter Camiker, Judicial Solitude] ("(A)
superior or at least coequal sovereign pose[s] less of an affront to states than suits by private persons ...
.").
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guided by political responsibility and judgment. 169 State dignity
interests are therefore low. Against those interests are the ubiquitous
need to vindicate federal law and the particular need to provide an
available judicial forum to prevent disunion. 170 On balance, dignity
loses, and states may be sued.
Also consistent with the dignity rationale is the Court's recognition
that immunity applies regardless of the remedy sought. 171 Subjecting
a state to suit against its will infringes upon the state's dignity.
Although compulsory payment of a money judgment from the
sovereign treasury would certainly insult a state's dignity to an even
greater extent, the mere compulsory appearance itself is sufficient to
enable the state to resist suit. 172

169. Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 ("Suits by the United States itself require the exercise of political
responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent from a broad delegation
to private persons to sue nonconsenting States.").
170. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 318 (1904) (asserting that the federal forum
serves as an important and impartial arbiter); Texas, 143 U.S. at 644-45 (explaining that the peace of the
Union might be threatened were federal courts not empowered to adjudicate controversies between
states and the federal government); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821) ("There
was not much reason to fear that foreign or sister States would be creditors to any considerable amount,
and there was reason to retain the jurisdiction of the Court in those cases, because it might be essential to
the preservation of peace. The amendment, therefore, extended to suits commenced or prosecuted by
individuals, but not to those brought by States."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 445 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (same).
171. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) ("But we have often made it clear
that the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment."); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994) (stating
that state sovereign immunity does not solely "preven[t] federal-court judgments that must be paid out
of a State's treasury"); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)
("While application of the collateral order doctrine in this type of case is justified in part by a concern
that States not be unduly burdened by litigation, its ultimate justification is the importance of ensuring
that the States' dignitary interests can be fully vindicated."); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982) ("It
would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit to enjoin the State
itself simply because no money judgment is sought."); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27 (1933)
("Expressly applying to suits in equity as well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands
for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are
asserted and prosecuted by an individual against a State.").
172. Fed Mar. Comm 'n, 535 U.S. at 765-66 ("[T]he doctrine's central purpose is to 'accord the States
the respect owed them as' joint sovereigns. It is for this reason, for instance, that sovereign immunity
applies regardless of whether a private plaintiffs suit is for monetary damages or some other type of
relief. Sovereign immunity does not merely constitute a defense to monetary liability or even to all types
of liability. Rather, it provides an immunity from suit" (quoting Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. at 146));
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (explaining that immunity applies
"regardless of the nature of the relief sought").
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The dignity rationale may also help to hannonize immunity-waiver
jurisprudence. When a state properly asserts sovereign immunity, the
forum court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. 173
Subject matter jurisdiction is never waivable, 174 yet states may waive
their sovereign immunity and consent to suit. 175 The Court has not
justified this paradox.
One possible answer lies in the dignity rationale, under which a
jurisdictional bar arises only when a state's dignity is impermissibly
impugned absent a compelling need to vindicate federal law.
Normally, a compelled suit suffices to impermissibly impugn state
dignity. If the state consents to suit, however, its appearance is both
voluntary and consensual. State dignity is not denigrated, and
jurisdiction therefore applies. In this case, the state does not waive
the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction; rather, the state refuses
to assert the necessary predicate for the jurisdictional bar in the first
place. 176

173. The Eleventh Amendment expressly limits "judicial Power." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Court
has interpreted that amendment as "partak[ing] of a jurisdictional bar." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 678 (1974).
174. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,398 (1975); Jackson v. Ashton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 148, 149
(1834).
175. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436,447 (1883); see also Lapides v. Bd. of Regents ofUniv. Sys.
of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 624 (2002) (holding that a state's voluntary removal to federal court waives
Eleventh Amendment immunity); Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) ("[A] State
can waive its Eleventh Amendment protection and allow a federal court to hear and decide a case
commenced or prosecuted against it"); 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON mE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (2d
ed. 1891) (James Madison) (stating that the Constitution "give[s] a citizen a right to be heard in the
federal courts; and if a state should condescend to be a party, this court may take cognizance of it"); THE
FEDERALIST No. 81, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) ("It is inherent in the
nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.").
176. See Dodson, Dignity, .supra note 124.
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In the alternative, the Court could, consistent with the dignity
rationale, reconceive the nature of state immunity from suit. Dignity
is a personal right of the sovereign, as is the immunity which follows.
In this respect, state sovereign immunity is more akin to a limitation
on personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction. 177 Being a
personal right, personal jurisdiction is, of course, waivable. In either
case, use of the dignity rationale could help ameliorate the conflict
between a state's ability to waive immunity and its effect on subject
matter jurisdiction. 178
On its face, language from a number of cases, most notably
Cohens v. Virginia, 179 opposes the dignity rationale as a unifying
force in the state sovereign immunity cases. In Cohens, Chief Justice
John Marshall held that the Supreme Court could review a state court
interpretation of federal law even if the state was the victorious party
in the state court decision! 80 In deciding that the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar federal review, the Chief Justice
emphatically disavowed that state dignity was a justification for the
Eleventh Amendment. 181
Cohens need not be read as completely derailing the dignity
rationale. If Justice Stevens is correct that Eleventh Amendment
immunity is different than state sovereign immunity, 182 then dignity
need not have anything to do with the former in order to have
everything to do with the latter. Chief Justice Marshall may have
been entirely correct in stating that the Eleventh Amendment is not

177. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 1653.
178. The Eleventh Amendment literally precludes jurisdiction over certain suits, even in the face of
state consent. One way to reconcile this inconsistency would be to adopt Justice Stevens' dualistic
interpretation of state sovereign immunity, that the Eleventh Amendment restriction on federal court
jurisdiction is nonwaivab1e, while non-amendment state sovereign immunity is waivable. See
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. I, 25-26 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring).
179. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). For a list of other cases, see supra note 124.
180. SeeCohens, 19U.S.at415.
181. See id. at 406 ("That [the Eleventh Amendment's) motive was not to maintain the sovereignty of
a State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the
nation, may be inferred from the terms of the amendment. ... We must ascribe the amendment, then, to
some other cause than the dignity of a State.").
182. See supra note 178.
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grounded in state dignity, 183 while at the same time leaving open the
availability for state sovereign dignity to resist certain federal
incursions that do not literally implicate the Eleventh Amendment.
In any case, the procedural stance of Cohens is not at all
inconsistent with the vertical federalism principles of state sovereign
immunity. If the state is a plaintiff in its own courts, as was the case
in Cohens, it has invoked the jurisdiction of its own courts and should
be held to have thereby consented to any appellate review, whether
initiated by the state itself or by the defendant. 184 As a corollary, if
the state has allowed itself to be sued as a defendant in its own courts,
then it has waived the immunity afforded to it by the rule of Alden
when the case comes before the Supreme Court. 185 Having consented,
the state may not invoke the dignity rationale to bar federal
jurisdiction in such a case. In addition, the countervailing vertical
vector in favor of national power, the need for federal appellate
review to vindicate federal law, is strong. 186 It would be entirely
183. Virginia and one of its citizens were the parties in Cohens; accordingly, the Eleventh
Amendment was not literally applicable. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
184. See McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 30 (1990)
("[W]hen a state court takes cognizance of a case, the State assents to appellate review by this Court of
the federal issues raised in the case 'whoever may be the parties to the original suit, whether private
persons or the state itself."' (quoting Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (II Pet.) 420, 585
(1837) (Story, J., dissenting))); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 445 (1900) ("[Consent to suit in state
court is] subject always to the condition, arising out of the supremacy of the Constitution of the United
States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, that the final judgment of the highest court of the State in
any action brought against it with its consent may be reviewed or reexamined [by this Court]."); Cohens,
19 U.S. at 380 (recognizing that states may have waived portions of their sovereign immunity by
ratifying the Constitution).
185. This issue does not implicate the problem of legislative consent to suit in state court, which has
been held inadequate under the rule requiring states to consent to suit in federal court. Compare
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) ("Thus, in order for a state statute or
constitutional provision to constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must specify the
State's intention to subject itself to suit in federal court . ... In the absence of an unequivocal waiver
specifically applicable to federal-court jurisdiction, we decline to find that California has waived its
constitutional immunity."), with Cohens, 19 U.S. at 256 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the
"longstanding, though unarticulated, rule that the Eleventh Amendment does not limit exercise of
otherwise proper federal appellate jurisdiction over suits [against states] from state courts"), and Smith
v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 445 (1900) (holding that a state's consent to suit in state court is "subject
always to the condition, arising out of the supremacy of the Constitution of the United States and the
laws made in pursuance thereof, that the final judgment of the highest court of the State in any action
brought against it with its consent may be reviewed or reexamined [by this Court]").
186. See Cohens, 19 U.S. at 407 ("A general interest might well be felt in leaving to a State the full
power of consulting its convenience in the adjustment of its debts, or of other claims upon it; but no
interest could be felt in so changing the relations between the whole and its parts, as to strip the
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consistent with other state sovereign immunity cases to reason that
the need for federal appellate review outweighs any state dignity
interest in immunity from review.
Dignity does not fully explain the rationale of either Principality of
Monaco v. Mississippi, 187 which held states immune from suits by a
foreign state, 188 or Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 189 which
held the Eleventh Amendment applicable to suits by Indian tribes. 190
Those cases rested on the conclusion that the states did not consent to
such suits in ratifying the Constitution. 191 Monaco and Blatchford
simply hold that states have immunity from such suits because the
states did not relinquish the immunity in ratification. 192
If the immunity rationale is grounded primarily in state dignity,
however, these cases may need rethinking. A suit brought by a
plaintiff with sovereignty at least equal to that of a state certainly
impugns dignity less than a suit brought by a private citizen.
Moreover, a state's invocation of immunity in its own courts from a
suit by a foreign sovereign implicates important national interests.
Generally, foreign and Indian affairs are the exclusive province of the
national government, and the need for national uniformity and
diplomacy is an important national interest. If the Court pursues its
dignity rationale, it owes an explanation for the results in these two
cases.
government of the means of protecting, but the instrumentality of its Courts, the constitution and laws
from active violation."); see also McKesson, 496 U.S. at28-29 ("To secure state-court compliance with,
and national uniformity of, federal law, the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts over cases
encompassing issues of federal law is subject to two conditions: State courts must interpret and enforce
faithfully the supreme Law of the Land, and their decisions are subject to review by this Court."
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI)) (footnotes omitted).
187. 292 u.s. 313 (1934).
188. See id. at 330 ("The foreign State lies outside the structure of the Union. The waiver or consent,
on the part of a State, which inheres in the acceptance of the constitutional plan, runs to the other States
who have likewise accepted that plan, and to the United States as the sovereign which the Constitution
creates. We perceive no ground upon which it can be said that any waiver or consent by a State of the
Union has run in favor of a foreign State.").
189. 501 u.s. 775 (1991).
190. Jd at 782 ("What makes the States' surrender of immunity from suit by sister States plausible is
the mutuality of that concession. There is no such mutuality with either foreign sovereigns or Indian
tribes .... [l]f the convention could not surrender the tribes' immunity for the benefit of the States, we
do not believe that it surrendered the States' immunity for the benefit of the tribes.").
191. See id. at 781-82; Monaco, 292 U.S. at 329-30.
192. See Monaco, 292 U.S. at330; Blatchford, 501 U.S. at781.
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B. Regulatory Immunity
State regulatory immunity is the ability of a state to resist federal
regulation of state governmental functions. In cases discussing this
doctrine, there is no question that the Constitution grants the federal
government the power to make such regulations; rather, the principal
question is whether some other power entitles the states to resist
application of these regulations. The federal vector of power
supporting the applicability of federal regulation to the states stems
from the need for validation of federal supremacy, and the state
vector of resistance to these regulations stems from the need for the
continued existence of states as governments. Because the doctrine of
regulatory immunity concerns vertical federalism, the question is not
whether Congress lacks the power to interfere, but whether the threat
to the continued existence of the states as governments is sufficient to
negate that power.
In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Court stated that
unexpressed aspects of state sovereignty create affirmative
limitations on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. 193
While acknowledging Congress' ability to impose the same
Commerce Clause power over individuals, the Court proclaimed
regulation of the states to be different. 194 The Court explained that the
states have sovereign characteristics that limit the otherwise proper
application of federal power. 195 States are not mere actors in an
economic market, but rather a sovereign government. 196 "If Congress
193. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976).
194. See id. at 845 ("It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating
individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of
the State in which they reside. It is quite another to uphold a similar exercise of congressional authority
directed, not to private citizens, but to the States as States.").
195. See id. at 842 ("This Court has never doubted that there are limits upon the power of Congress to
override state sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate
commerce which are conferred by Art[icle] I of the Constitution."); id. at 845 ("We have repeatedly
recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be
impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to
reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that
manner.").
196. See id. at 854 ("But we have reaffirmed today that the States as States stand on a quite different
footing from an individual or a corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to
regulate commerce.").
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may withdraw from the States the authority to make those
fundamental employment decisions upon which their systems for
performance of these functions must rest, we think there would be
little left of the States' 'separate and independent existence. "' 197
Thus, when legislation purports to intrude upon state governmental
functions that are essential to separate and to independent existence,
state sovereignty limits Congress' powers. 198
National League of Cities overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 199 which
held that:
"valid general regulations of commerce do not cease to be
regulations of commerce because a State is involved. If a State is
engaging in economic activities that are validly regulated by the
Federal Government when engaged in by private persons, the
State too may be forced to conform its activities to federal
regulation. "200

Both cases contemplated the existence of a line of federal
encroachment beyond which state sovereign existence would be
impermissibly threatened.2° 1 The two cases just disagreed as to where
that line was.2°2

197. /d. at 851 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559,580 (1911)).
198. See Nat'/ League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852, overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans.
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
199. 392 u.s. 183 (1968).
200. /d. at 196-97.
20 I. See id. at 196 (noting that the states had "ample power to prevent ... 'the utter destruction of the
State as a sovereign political entity"') (citation omitted in original); Nat'/ League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
845 ("The question we must resolve here, then, is whether these [objects of federal regulation] are
'functions essential to separate and independent existence' [of the states.]" (quoting Lane County v.
Oregon, 74 U.S. 71 (1868))).
202. The application of federal fair labor standards to state employers does not really jeopardize the
states' independent sovereign existence enough to justify exemption. See Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196-97.
Why would federal regulation of overtime provisions for state employees effectively nullify the states'
separate and independent existence? See Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851. The Court gave no
reasonable answer to this question. Because the justification for the exemption is the Constitution's
recognition of continued sovereign existence of the states, the court should only exempt states from
federal regulation that imposes a real threat to that existence.
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For the most part, the methodology of National League of Cities is
appropriate vertical federalism analysis. 203 National League ofCities
recognized the legitimacy of federal regulations in general but noted
that other questions arise when a regulation affects states as
governmental entities because states have guaranteed continued
existence under the Constitution? 04 The Court simply determined that
state sovereign interests outweigh the importance of the federal
regulation's application to the states, in effect drawing the line of
impermissibility differently than the Court did in Wirtz.
National League of Cities, however, did not cleanly rely on vertical
federalism vectors. Indeed, the opinion twice straddles the line
between horizontal and vertical federalism doctrines by relying on
the inherent limits of Congress' powers and the Tenth Amendment
for affirmative limitations. For example, the Court stated: "We hold
that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly
displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas
of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the
authority granted Congress by [the Commerce Clause]."205 The
phrase "not within the authority granted Congress" sounds like a
horizontal federalism constraint based on the limited nature of federal
powers. 206 In a vertical federalism case like National League of
Cities, a more accurate statement would be that the regulations
actually are within the authority granted to Congress but that the
Constitution's recognition ofthe states as working state governments
affirmatively limits their application to core state functions. In
addition, National League ofCities could be read as relying in part on
affirmative limitations in the Tenth Amendment. 207 The Tenth
203. National League of Cities even characterized the federal government's ability to intrude upon
core state governmental functions as "abrogation," a common term in Eleventh Amendment cases. See
Nat'/ League ofCities, 426 U.S. at 846-55.
204. See id.
205. /d. at 852.
206. /d.
207. Although National League of Cities conspicuously dodged direct reliance on the Tenth
Amendment (referring to it only once), later cases have characterized National League of Cities in
horizontal federalism terms grounded in the Tenth Amendment. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,
236 (1983) (asserting that National League of Cities "drew from the Tenth Amendment an 'affirmative
limitation on the exercise of [congressional power under the Commerce Clause] akin to other commerce
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Amendment is not an affirmative limitation on congressional power;
rather, the Tenth Amendment is a confirmation of horizontal
federalism-the scope of congressional power. In assessing the
relative strengths of state and of federal power, the Tenth
Amendment is of no help. These two flaws in the reasoning of
National League of Cities confound proper application of vertical
principles to the case.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,208 which
overruled National League of Cities as unworkable, 209 fares no better.
Garcia begins the right way for a vertical federalism case by
proposing to look for constitutional "postulates" behind the bare text
of the Constitution to support state resistance to enumerated
powers. 210 But the Court then turns to three factors of little relevance
to the inquiry: the grants and withholdings of power in Article I, the
federal power of judicial review in Article III, and the incorporation
of the Bill of Rights limitations through the Fourteenth
Amendment.211 The grants and withholdings of power in Article I are
quintessentially horizontal federalism vectors that allocate the areas
of regulation between the state and the federal governments. These
grants and withholdings have little bearing on the question of federal
regulation of state activities that was at issue in Garcia. The judicial
power of Article III is a vertical vector without particular connection
to that regulation. The incorporation argument, as I have explained, is
predominantly horizontal in nature. 212
A more appropriate inquiry would have been one analogous to the
method that the Court used in National League of Cities and similar
to the test proposed by Justice O'Connor in her dissent in Garcia? 13
The Constitution guarantees the continued existence of the states as
power affirmative limitations contained in the Constitution"' (quoting Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S.
at 841)).
208. 469 u.s. 528 (1985).
209. /d. at 53!.
210. /d. at547.
211. See id. at 548-49.
212. See supra note 71; see also infra Part Ill. F.
213. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The proper resolution, I suggest, lies in
weighing state autonomy as a factor in the balance when interpreting the means by which Congress can
exercise its authority on the States as States.").
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independent governmental entities. Does a federal regulation
impermissibly infringe upon that guarantee? If so, the states are
exempt from that regulation. If not, that regulation can apply to the
states. 214
The Court in Garcia found protection of state sovereignty in the
structural incorporation of state interests in the procedural
mechanisms of the federal government. 215 I am troubled by the faith
of the majority in Garcia in congressional self-restraint, and its
abdication of judicial responsibility because I fail to see how the
structural federalism protections built into national representation
adequately protect the Constitutional guarantee of state existence.
The national government's structural representation of state interests,
while perhaps comforting to federalist concerns, does not necessarily
guarantee the states' continued existence, and it most certainly does
not remove the federal encroachments on state sovereignty beyond
constitutional question. Our system of government depends on
constitutional limitations and external checks and balances, not hopes
for internal self-restraint in the face of speculative electoral pressure.
Thankfully, Garcia leaves open the possibility that process
federalism is not the sole protection against impermissible
encroachment of state sovereign existence. The Court in Garcia
concluded that the statute as applied to state employers did not
deprive state governments of their guaranteed existence, and thus
crossed no constitutionalline. 216 In the absence of a congressional act
actually crossing that constitutional line, process federalism
adequately protects normative federalism, and the courts should
usually defer to Congress rather than create prophylactic buffer zones

214. It is possible that some prophylactic rule could exempt states from regulation that would not
fully eliminate the states as governments. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
302 ( 1978) ("Of course, no one expects Congress to obliterate the states, at least in one fell swoop. If
there is any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions-in the prospect that Congress will nibble
away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell.").
215. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51 (explaining that "the composition of the Federal Government
was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress").
216. See id. at 556 ("These cases do not require us to identify or define what affirmative limits the
constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce
Clause.").
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for state protection? 17 In other words, in this case, the states' vertical
resistance vector was not strong enough to justify constitutional
regulatory immunity. If that is what the majority meant, then perhaps
Garcia leaves open the possibility that in a case of more pronounced
federal encroachment, the states' resistance vector might prevail.
The dissenters struggled with the confusion generated by National
League of Cities. Justices Powell and O'Connor both mistakenly
focused on the Tenth Amendment? 18 As I have argued, the Tenth
Amendment is simply inapplicable to questions of vertical
federalism, and the Garcia majority was correct to disregard it.
Justice O'Connor's dissent likewise wavered on whether the
Commerce Clause by itself contained sufficient authorization for the
federal legislation in question, 219 an inquiry reserved for horizontal
federalism analysis.
Although the most defensible argument for regulatory immunity is
the constitutional guarantee of independent state existence, the
counterargument that states should be immune from the indignity of
federal regulation of traditional or core state governmental functions
is consistent with vertical federalism principles. 220 Such regulation,
the counterargument posits, would offend the dignity of the states as
independent sovereign entities and demote them to the same level as
individuals. This counterargument would have to reason around the
more deferential Articles of Confederation, which subjected the states
to direct congressional regulation. 221 In addition, any indignity would
then be properly subject to amelioration by the process federalism
argument endorsed by Garcia. If Garcia truly left future state
regulatory immunity questions open, the recent influx of dignity
language may prompt a new line of state regulatory immunity cases.

217. I say "usually" because I am unprepared to dispense with prophylaxes entirely. See supra note
214.
218. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 568-74 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(focusing on the "spirit of the Tenth Amendment'').
219. See id. at 584-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
220. See Dodson, Dignity, supra note 124.
221. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 945-47 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144,210 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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C. Anticommandeering

The anticommandeering cases illustrate a third vertical federalism
doctrine. These cases deal with resolving state attempts to resist
federal mandates directed at state governmental mechanisms. Federal
commandeering implicates primarily sovereign dignity but also a
touch of sovereign existence. Where the effect of the regulation
would essentially destroy the states as independent sovereign
governments, the Constitution's guarantee of state existence bars the
regulation. When it does not, state dignity may still demand that
Congress not use the commandeering mechanism on the states.
In Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 222 the
Court considered the validity of a federal regulation that directed
state utilities agencies to consider specified standards in their
ratemaking functions. 223 Although it recognized that sovereignty
entails the authority to make fundamental legislative decisions, 224 the
Court upheld the federal statute because it only instructed the state to
consider certain standards, not to adopt them. 225 Because the
regulation was not a direct compulsion of state legislation sufficient
to threaten the state's "separate and independent existence," 226 and
because the regulation was within Congress' Commerce Clause
power, 227 the Court held the regulation valid. 228
The dissenters argued in favor of affirmative Tenth Amendment
limitations?29 Indeed, in Justice O'Connor's view, the Tenth
Amendment affirmatively prohibits federal regulation which impairs

222. 456 u.s. 742 (1982).
223. See id. at 746-47.
224. See id. at 761 ("Indeed, having the power to make decisions and to set policy is what gives the
State its sovereign nature.").
225. See id. at 764 ("Titles I and III ofPURPA require only consideration of federal standards.").
226. See id. at 765-66 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868)).
227. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm 'n, 456 U.S. at 753-59.
228. See id. at 771 (holding that "Congress can require a state administrative body to consider
proposed regulations as a condition to its continued involvement in a pre-emptible field"); see also id. at
769 n.32 ("We hold only that Congress may impose conditions on the State's regulation of private
conduct in a pre-emptible area.").
229. See id. at 773 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[nhe Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment
embody distinct limitations on federal power."); id. at 778 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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"a state's ability to function as a state."230 She may have the right
idea of protecting state sovereign existence, but she certainly uses the
wrong weaponry with the Tenth Amendment horizontal vector. 231
Justice O'Connor could have advocated the stronger consideration
of state sovereign dignity. 232 Federal preemption of state regulation
and federal commandeering of state mechanisms is different, even if
the end result is the same. That difference is in part due to the
treatment of the states by the federal government. Coercing unwilling
state governments to do the federal government's bidding subjects
the states to some indignity, as if they were federal prefectures rather
than independent sovereignties. Better to preempt the field, the states
might say, than to order us to fetch, as a master does his dog. Indeed,
Justice O'Connor hinted at that suggestion, albeit for practical
reasons?33

230. See id. at 778, 785-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 455 U.S. 678,686 (1982)).
231. See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947) ("[T)he Tenth
Amendment has been consistently construed 'as not depriving the national government of authority to
resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the
permitted end."' (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941))).
232. In all fairness, none of the opinions considered state dignity at all, perhaps in large part because
the proponents of the rationale had not yet formed the concept into a meaningful weapon.
233. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 787 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The States
might well prefer that Congress simply impose the standards [through preemption).").
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In New York v. United States, 234 Justice O'Connor took revenge.
New York challenged a federal statute that required the state to
regulate according to Congress' instructions or accept ownership of
hazardous waste .235 The Court held that Congress could not compel
the states to choose between commandeered regulation and forced
title to the waste. 236 The Court did not question that Congress had the
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the disposal of
radioactive waste. 237 The Court did not question that Congress could
preempt state regulation under the Supremacy Clause or induce state
compliance under the Spending Power. 238 Rather, the Court took
issue with the method of Congress in directing the states to act. 239
The problem with Justice O'Connor's majority opinion, however,
is that it mistakenly looked to horizontal sources for vertical
resistance vectors. Although acknowledging that the question of the
limits of federal power was the inverse of the question of the scope of
the Tenth Amendment, 240 the Court nevertheless engaged in an
analysis of unexpressed limitations "confirm[ed]" by the Tenth
Amendment. 241 The problem with this reasoning is not necessarily its
treatment of the Tenth Amendment as something beyond its text but
its treatment of unexpressed postulates as horizontal federalism
vectors. 242 Horizontal federalism merely delineates the very
234. 505 u.s. 144 (1992).
235. /d. at 154.
236. /d. at 149.
23 7. See id. at I 59-60.
238. See id at 158-60.
239. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161 ("This litigation instead concerns the circumstances under which
Congress may use the States as implements of regulation; that is, whether Congress may direct or
otherwise motivate the States to regulate in a particular field or a particular way.").
240. /d. at 156 ("In a case like these, involving the division of authority between federal and state
governments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each other. If a power is delegated to Congress in
the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States;
if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a
power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress."); id. at I 57 ("[The Tenth Amendment] is
essentially a tautology."). The Court omitted the obvious third possibility: That a congressional act
might exceed its Article I powers but nevertheless not be within the states' Tenth Amendment reserved
powers.
241. See id. at 157 ("[T]he Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is
subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.").
242. See id. at 177 ("Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside Congress'
enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
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boundaries of federal and state power that the Court already resolved
when it determined that the Commerce Clause authorized the
legislation.
A rationale for the Court's result that is more consistent with
vertical vectoral analysis would eschew the Tenth Amendment's
horizontal federalism in favor of some state power to resist otherwise
valid exercises of federal power, such as state dignity interests.
Surely, ordering the state legislatures to legislate impinges the states'
dignity. Like sulking children, the states must then obey under
penalty of punishment. A more appropriate analysis would weigh the
state sovereign dignity interest against the need for federal
superiority. If preemption or Spending Clause legislation could have
accomplished the permissible federal mandates, perhaps dignity
would have sufficed to resist the particular federal commandeering in
New York? 43
However, the dignity rationale might actually work against the end
result in New York. By phrasing the issue as one of horizontal
federalism, the Court rejected the waiver argument. If the
Constitution does not authorize a congressional regulation, it is void,
regardless of whether the states consent to it. But if the dignity of the
sovereign is the justification for shielding the states from federal
regulation, the regulation may be valid with the states' consent.
In New York, that is exactly what happened. The state ofNew York
requested, and then consented to, the federal regime and only later,
after losing its gamble, objected. 244 The United States argued that
New York had waived its objection to the legislation, but the Court,
holding that the legislation was beyond the authorization of Article I,
refused to consider the waiver. 245 As Justice White pointed out, that

Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established by
the Constitution."); id. at 178 ("No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution
simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate.").
243. Cf id. at 149 ("We conclude that while Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to
encourage the States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders,
the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel the States to do so.").
244. See New York, 505 U.S. at 189-90 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
245. See id. at 182 ("Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the
departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the •consent' of state officials. . . . State
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conclusion was in conflict with the ability of a state to waive another
unenumerated constitutional attribute of state sovereignty-immunity
from suit. 246
By using horizontal vectors, the Court skirted the very relevant
vertical federalism issue of waiver and placed its anticommandeering
jurisprudence in considerable tension with its state sovereign
immunity jurisprudence. 247 Resort to the vertical vector of state
sovereign dignity and its attendant waivability would have better
aligned the two doctrines.
In Printz v. United States, 248 the Court followed the precedent set
in New York in striking down a portion of the Brady Handgun
Control Act that commanded state and local officials to conduct
background checks on gun purchases. 249 Unlike prior
anticomrnandeering cases, the Court correctly admitted that "no
constitutional text speak[s] to this precise question"250 and turned to
state sovereignty principles, a proper methodology for vertical
federalism questions. 251 The Court listed several state "sovereignty"
provisions, including the Tenth Amendment but noted that the Tenth
Amendment merely "rendered express" the limited enumeration of
Article I powers. 252 The Court never actually relied upon that
Amendment in its reasoning. Indeed, the Court only mentioned it for
background and, in response to the dissent, avoided direct reliance on
it: "Th[e dissent's] argument also falsely presumes that the Tenth
Amendment is the exclusive textual source of protection for
officials thus cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in
the Constitution.").
246. /d. at 200 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I fail to understand the
reasoning behind the Court's selective distinctions among the various aspects of sovereignty that may
and may not be waived and do not believe these distinctions will survive close analysis in future
cases.").
247. Indeed, prohibiting the states from consenting to the regulation at issue actually infringes on their
independent and autonomous authority to do so, thus pitting judicial protection against the very state
dignity vertical federalism strives to protect.
248. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Whereas New York involved the commandeering of state legislatures,
Printz involved the commandeering of state and local executive officers.
249. See id. at 902.
250. /d. at 905.
251. See id. at 918 (turning to the Constitution's "'essential postulate[s]'" (quoting Principality of
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,322 (1934))) (alteration in Printz).
252. Printz, 521 U.S. at 919.
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principles of federalism. Our system of dual sovereignty is reflected
in numerous constitutional provisions ...." 253
The Court instead turned to history and emphasized that nothing
indicated that "Congress could impose these [commandeering]
responsibilities without the consent of the States."254 This language
harkens to the dignity rationale of the state sovereign immunity
doctrine. While this language brings the anticommandeering doctrine
more in line with its vertical federalism counterpart, it makes explicit
the tension with the conclusion in New York that the states could not
consent to the commandeering.
Although the Court did not pursue the dignity rationale, it turned to
the other appropriate commandeering issue: the guarantee of
independent state government. The Court stated:
Preservation of the States as independent and autonomous
political entities is arguably less undermined by requiring them
to make policy in certain fields than ... by "reduc[ing] [them] to
puppets of a ventriloquist Congress[.]" ... It is an essential
attribute of the States' retained sovereignty that they remain
independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of
authority. It is no more compatible with this independence and
autonomy that their officers be "dragooned" . . . into
administering federal law, than it would be compatible with the
independence and autonomy of the United States that its officers
be impressed into service for the execution of state laws. 255

Aside from skirting development of the dignity and of the waiver
implications, the majority opinion in Printz correctly looked to
principles of vertical federalism. The Court avoided the troublesome
Tenth Amendment and focused on the states' ability to resist federal
incursions into their sovereignty. It is highly unlikely that the line
drawn by Printz actually accords with the constitutional line that

253. /d. at 923 n.l3.
254. /d. at 910-11.
255. /d. at 928 (citations omitted).
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protects states from virtual elimination as governmental entities,256 or
even that it offends state sovereignty to a degree rendered
impermissible by the Constitution, but at least the Court stayed away
from horizontal federalism principles.
Vertical federalism permits a principled distinction between
commandeering of state legislators and commandeering of state
executives. The vertical power of the federal government to
commandeer any branch of state government remains the same, but
the resistance vectors of state legislatures are arguably greater than
that of state executive officials. Directing state legislatures to
legislate may be a deeper affront to state dignity and a more caustic
erosion of state governmental power than commanding state officials
to execute federal law. Therefore, anticommandeering may have a
sounder basis in the former than in the latter.
I see no reason, however, for the Court's application of the
anticommandeering doctrine to local governments. The plaintiffs in
Printz were local government officials, not state officers. 257 I find no
basis exists for local government sovereign dignity in the
Constitution, much less for any recognition of local sovereignty. 258
Moreover, the application of anticommandeering principles to local
governments is in tension with the exemption of local governments
from the protections of sovereign immunity. 259
Should the Court decide to act as the guardian of normative
federalism values, it may be appropriate to consider protecting local
governments from federal intrusion upon a weighed balancing of the
federalism issues affecting local governments. But local governments
have no constitutional status. If the Court's protection of the states
stems from something inherent in statehood, it is difficult to
understand how local governments could have the same
protections. 260
256. See id at 932 (refusing to apply a type of balancing test suggested by National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
257. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 955 n.l6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
258. Printz itself relied only on precedent, namely the overruled case National League of Cities, as
support for its defense oflocal sovereignty. See id. at 931 n.l5.
259. See id. at 955 n.l6 (Stevens, J ., dissenting).
260. See Althouse, supra note 5, at 262.
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D. Ex parte Young

The Ex parte Youni 61 doctrine "carv[ed] out a necessary
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity" to permit certain suits
for prospective injunctive relief against state officers who, acting
under the authority of state law, violate federal law.262 Because
federal law is superior to state law, the state law is in effect invalid,
and therefore, the officer acts without the sovereign protection of the
state.2 63 Ex parte Young is justified as necessary to assure the
supremacy offederallaw. 264
As a vertical federalism issue, Ex parte Young is consistent with
the dignity rationale. Although suits against the states impermissibly
implicate state sovereign dignity, violations of federal law by state
officers are divorced from the authority of the state. Because suits
against state officers are not suits against the state, officers have little
ability to resist vertical federal power. In addition, suits against
officers are arguably less offensive to state dignity than suits against
the state itself. 265
Moreover, dignity helps to reconcile the tension between the
availability of injunctive relief against state officers under Ex parte
261. 209 u.s. 123 (1908).
262. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).
263. See Young, 209 U.S. at 160 ("The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from
responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 699 (1949) (extending the concept of Young to violations of federal
statutes by federal officers). At English common law, the King was assumed never to have authorized an
illegal act by his agents, and therefore the illegal acts of the agents could not be attributable to the King.
See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 244.
264. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 747 (1999) ("(Young] is based in part on the premise that
sovereign immunity bars relief against States and their officers in both state and federal courts, and that
certain suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers must therefore be permitted if the
Constitution is to remain the supreme law of the land."); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)
("Both prospective and retrospective relief implicate Eleventh Amendment concerns, but the availability
of prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause.
Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal
interest in assuring the supremacy of that law."); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, lOS (1984) ("(T]he Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to
vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible .... "); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 106
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Ex parte Young was the culmination of
efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective
supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution.").
265. See Caminker, Judicial Solitude, supra note 168, at 84.
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Young and the prohibition on the commandeering of state officers
under Printz. 266 In the former, the states and their officers are given a
chance to self-conform to binding federal law and are only directed
by federal courts if they fail. Giving state officers prior opportunity to
conform to binding federal law ameliorates any subsequent
enforcement's affront to state dignity. The resulting failure to abide
by federal law also justifies a greater need for the exercise of direct
federal power over the recalcitrant state officers. In the latter case,
Congress takes state autonomy out of the officers' hands in the first
instance. Indignity is arguably greater in the latter. 267 The vertical
federalism rationale of dignity then helps resolve the apparent
misalignment between anticommandeering and prospective
injunctions, two closely related vertical federalism doctrines.
However, dignity alone cannot explain why Ex parte Young suits
are limited to prospective injunctive relief. 268 Sovereign immunity
bars officer suits seeking monetary relief from the state treasury. 269 If
the state cannot order the officer's conduct, the suit should not offend
state dignity regardless of whether compensatory retroactive damages
are sought. 270 To the extent that a state officer's violation of federal
law implicates the state itself, the state suffers greater indignity when
a court forces it to act by injunction than by simple payment of a
money judgment. Some measure of indignity exists regardless of
its result. The compensatory/injunctive distinction walks a tight
line between the state's dignity interest and the competing need
266. See Althouse, supra note 5, at 265 ("If we were really concerned about 'commandeering' the
states with lawsuits, we shouldn't tolerate the injunctions that can be had through the Ex Parte Young
[sic] device or the lawsuits permitted when sovereign immunity is abrogated using the Fourteenth
Amendment power.").
267. Cj RECORDS, supra note 92, at 28 (Gouvemor Morris) (arguing that a congressional negative on
state laws "would disgust all the States" but fmding acceptable judicial invalidation of state law).
268. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,664 (1974).
269. See id.; Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) ("[W]hen the
action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in
interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are
nominal defendants.").
270. See In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 507 (1887) ("If, therefore, an individual, acting under the
assumed authority of a State, as one of its officers, and under color of its laws, comes into conflict with
the superior authority of a valid law of the United States, he is stripped of his representative character,
and subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct The State has no power to
impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.").
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to enforce federal law-a line which, though perhaps possible to
defend on the dignity rationale alone, has not been sufficiently
defended by the Court.
Dignity is not the only ammunition in the vertical federalism
battle, however. Suits for money damages that would draw from the
state treasury may interfere with the ability of the state to govern
effectively? 71 Indeed, the very threat of multiple damage awards in
favor of a very limited number of individual plaintiffs, perhaps not
even citizens of the defendant state, would risk emptying the state
treasuries at the expense of the state's ability to provide for its
citizens' general welfare. To the extent that private lawsuits would
bankrupt state treasuries, states would lose the ability to function as
governments. The vertical vector of maintaining the states as viable,
functioning sovereign governments, featured so prominently m the
justify
the
regulatory
immunity
cases,
helps 272
73
compensatory/injunctive distinction of Ex parte Young?
E. Commerce Clause Limitations

The question of the scope of Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause is principally a horizontal federalism vector? 74
Certain members of the Court have not been consistent in treating it
as such, however. The majority opinion and Justice Breyer's dissent
271. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) ("The general rule is that a suit is against the
sovereign if 'the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with
the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Government from
acting, or to compel it to act."') (internal citations omitted).
272. "Helps" is an appropriate term here because the constitutional guarantee of state governmental
existence is a very difficult line to cross. The line that the Court draws with the compensatory/injunctive
relief distinction may not adequately enforce federal law, especially because practical methods, such as
damages caps, may help ensure continued state viability even in the face of retrospective compensatory
liability. The goal of this Article, however, is not to test the empirical validity of the Court's federalism
doctrines or quibble about where the lines should be drawn so much as to try to understand the basic
premises and create a coherent framework for reconciling federalism theories.
273. The Court has hinted at importing the sovereign existence vector into Ex parte Young in earlier
opinions. In Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), the Court held that non-monetary relief
which significantly affects state sovereignty is not amenable to the Ex parte Young exception. See id. at
287 (refusing to permit Ex parte Young suits for de facto quiet title to land because "Idaho's sovereign
interest in its lands and waters would be affected in a degree fully as intrusive as almost any conceivable
retroactive levy upon funds in its Treasury").
274. See supra Part D. A.
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in United States v. Lopez are fine examples of proper horizontal
federalism analysis. 275 The Court began with the horizontal
federalism principle of limited national government, and noted that
separate regulatory spheres of power guard against the risk of
tyranny. 276 After reviewing precedent, the Court concluded that the
legislation exceeded the power granted by the Commerce Clause. 277
Justice Breyer, relying mostly on precedent and the factual realities
of the impact of guns on interstate commerce, reached the opposite
conclusion. 278 Although these opinions reached different conclusions,
neither strayed far from horizontal federalism vectors.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence is another matter. He likened the
Court's role in enforcing horizontal federalism to that of vertical
federalism when he referenced several doctrines with strong vertical
vectors? 79 He also intimated that expansive, though correct,
interpretations of the Commerce Clause might impermissibly intrude
on state sovereignty, a vertical problem. 280 "Absent a stronger
connection or identification with commercial concerns that are
central to the Commerce Clause, that interference [with state
sovereignty] contradicts the federal balance the Framers designed and
that this Court is obliged to enforce."281
It is unclear if Justice Kennedy attempted to import from vertical
federalism cases affirmative resistance vectors to limit otherwise
valid exercises of the Commerce Clause power. He probably did not
do so wholeheartedly, because he agreed with the majority that the
legislation at issue exceeded the bare terms of the Commerce Clause
power. 282 But to the extent that he would incorporate vertical vectors
or counsel judicial abstention in cases otherwise controlled by text
275. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (striking down a law regulating gun possession in areas near schools).
276. See id at 552.
277. See id. at 567-68.
278. See id. at 615-16 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
279. See id at 578-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing abstention cases, choice-of-law cases, federal
review cases, preemption cases, and habeas corpus cases).
280. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If
Congress attempts that extension, then at the least we must inquire whether the exercise of national
power seeks to intrude upon an area of traditional state concern.").
281. /d. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
282. See id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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and interpretative precedent, without some stated reason for doing so,
his opinion is unsettling. Better to overrule precedent and ground
Commerce Clause power in a horizontal relationship supported by
original understanding, as Justice Thomas suggests,283 than to devise
a priori affirmative vertical limitations on congressional power to
regulate individuals and further confound federalism coherence.
Vertical and horizontal mixing finds its way from Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lopez to the majority and Justice
Breyer's dissenting opinions in United States v. Morrison. 284
Although essentially tracking much of the Lopez opinion, the Court
referenced the importance of maintaining "areas of traditional state
regulation," 285 a reference that harkens to the regulatory immunity
cases. The Commerce Clause makes no mention of any exception for
areas of regulation traditionally reserved to the states, and that
analysis has no place in horizontal federalism inquiries. The textual
limits of the Commerce Clause, wherever one deems them
applicable, are both real and constitutional, and must be the primary
guideposts for estimating whether that power has been exceeded.
The practical problem with which the Justices wrestled was that
virtually any local activity of any import in American society today
affects interstate commerce. The fears of the majority in Lopez and
Morrison were real: The Commerce Clause is probably expansive
enough to swallow most regulation of local activity. As Justice
Breyer points out, the focal concern is ''the difficulty of finding a
workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone-a set of
comprehensible interpretive rules that courts might use to impose
some meaningful limit, but not too great a limit, upon the scope of
the legislative authority that the Commerce Clause delegates to
Congress. "286

283. See id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
284. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). There, the Court struck down Commerce Clause legislation protecting the
victims of gender-motivated violence because the law exceeded Congress' authority under Article I. See
id. 81617-19.
285. /d. at615-16.
286. Jd at 656 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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An unlimited Commerce Clause might threaten the legislative
abilities of the states to such a degree that the salutary benefits of
horizontal federalism become negligible. This concern is a practical
one, however, without clear constitutional dimension, and is not an
affirmative constitutional limitation on otherwise valid exercises of
federal power. The decision whether to exercise permissible federal
power rightly belongs to the reasoned judgment of Congress, which
presumably takes federalism norms into consideration. 287 The Court
could help ensure application of only clear congressional intent by
implementing a clear statement rule, for example, but it is undeniable
that Congress can exercise Commerce Clause power, if it chooses to
do so, when authorized by the Constitution, regardless of its disregard
for salutary federalism norms.
Congress could exercise the permissible federal power to such a
grand scope and with such little self-restraint that the very existence
of the states would be threatened. Vectoral federalism analysis might
pose a solution. The question of whether Congress is within its
authorized scope is clearly horizontal, and the ar~swer to the inquiry is
that the power is permitted. However, excessive regulation implicates
the guaranteed existence of the states, the vertical vector of the
regulatory immunity cases, for part of state existence is the ability to
regulate citizens. If federal regulation becomes so pervasive as to
threaten the very existence of the states as regulatory governments,
vertical resistance vectors may provide some affirmative protection.
Until vertical federalism incursions are implicated, however, the
scope of the Commerce Clause remains a peculiarly horizontal
federalism question, with horizontal federalism ar1swers.

287. See id. at 647-48 (Souter, J., dissenting). It is not inconsistent to argue that the Court should defer
to structural federalism protections within the permissible range of horizontal federal power, but that the
Court should not necessarily defer to structural federalism to protect the constitutional guarantee of the
continued existence of the states in the regulatory immunity cases. In the former case, no vertical vector
arises, and so the Court should defer to Congress' decision to exercise the federal power granted to it. In
the latter, the vertical vector of guaranteed state existence creates a constitutional question that the Court
must enforce.
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F Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment ts a combination of horizontal and
vertical vectors. The first two sections are horizontal because they
constrict state power by stripping the states of their power to abridge
civil rights. 288 Section 5289 is vertical, however, because it enables the
federal government to enforce the preceding provisions against the
states themselves. 290
Section 5 is a powerful vertical vector. It authorizes federal power
directly upon the states in ways not contemplated by the original
Constitution.Z91 It is, therefore, entirely appropriate for vertical
federalism questions to favor federal power when Congress exercises
its enforcement power under section 5. Moreover, attempts to enforce
state compliance with the Constitution pose less of an affront than
those to enforce mere statutory rights. 292 Thus, the Court has
recognized increased congressional power to abrogate state sovereign
immunitr93 and to regulate state governments294 when acting
288. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,456 (1976) (asserting that the substantive sections of the
Fourteenth Amendment "themselves embody significant limitations on state authority"); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880) ("The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the
States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power.").
289. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.").
290. Section 5 has also been interpreted from a horizontal federalism viewpoint. In City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 ( 1997), the Court held Congress' attempt to enact legislation under section 5 to
have exceeded its enforcement powers. This is a horizontal federalism inquiry because it goes to the
scope of federal power rather than its application to the states. /d. at 536.
291. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) ("We noted that [section] I of the
Fourteenth Amendment contained prohibitions expressly directed at the States and that [section] 5 of the
Amendment expressly provided that 'The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."' (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5)).
292. See Caminker, Judicial Solitude, supra note 168, at 84.
293. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
294. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.l8 (1983) (reaffirming "that when properly
exercising its power under [section] 5, Congress is not limited by the same Tenth Amendment
constraints that circumscribe the exercise of its Commerce Clause powers"); City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) ("[P]rinciples of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to
congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments
'by appropriate legislation.' Those Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal
power and an intrusion on state sovereignty."); see also Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
852 n.l7 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) ("We
express no view as to whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral
operations of state governments by exercising authority granted it under other sections of the
Constitution such as the spending power ... or ... the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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pursuant to its enforcement powers. The same should also apply to
federal attempts to commandeer state governments, 295 another
vertical federalism doctrine. All three concepts are consistent with
proper vectoral federalism analysis: All are based on the same
vertical vectors, and the Fourteenth Amendment simply tips the
balance of vertical power in favor of the federal government in each
case. While the enforcement power probably does not permit
wholesale elimination of the states, it should at least abrogate state
resistance based on dignity, and it might justify abrogation of any
prophylactic rules created for the protection of other state sovereignty
interests.
In a recent essay, Professor Vicki Jackson posed a very important
question?96 The Court has held that Article I confers no power on
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity but that section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment does. 297 The articulated distinction
between section 5 and Article I is that the Fourteenth Amendment
somehow modifies or limits state sovereign immunity but Article I
does not. Professor Jackson argued that the only credible distinction
between the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I is one of
chronology. The Fourteenth Amendment altered the immunity
doctrine because the Amendment came after the immunity doctrine,
while Article I either came before or contemporaneously with the
doctrine. 298 She then asks why the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
accompanying shift in federal-state power, could not have also

295. Caminker, State Sovereignty, supra note 24, at 1006 n.l3 ("Arguably, congressional
commandeering as a means of exercising its section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's
limitations on state authority (or its similar section 2 power to enforce the Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments) does not raise the same federalism issues, since the Reconstruction Amendments were
openly designed to curb state sovereignty."); Jackson, Federalism, supra note 44, at 2211 ("The line
apparently drawn in the Eleventh Amendment caselaw, between Article I powers and powers granted by
later-enacted amendments, offers a plausible stopping point for the Court's anticommandeering rule.")
(footnotes omitted); accord City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179; cf Fitzpatrick, 421 U.S. at 455 (explaining
that section 5 legislation may be valid even if it prohibits conduct that intrudes into "legislative spheres
of autonomy previously reserved to the States").
296. See Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, supra note 5.
297. See Fitzpatrick, 421 U.S. at456.
298. See Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1273 (arguing that chronology most
persuasively explains the distinction).

2003)

VECTORAL FEDERALISM

453

modified the antecedent Article I powers. 299 She hypothesized that
the Fourteenth Amendment might have expanded Article I powers
such as Congress' Commerce Clause power in such a way as to
justify a different result than that reached in United States v.
Morrison and provide a different abrogation power than that rejected
in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida? 00
Professor Jackson asked a good question, but her analysis was
ultimately incomplete without a vectoral view. Good reason exists to
query whether the Fourteenth Amendment altered other constitutional
provisions, especially if chronology provides the sole justification.
Chronology is not the sole justification, however, and she dismissed
other justifications too quickly.
Professor Jackson identified four possible bases other than
chronology for the distinction between the Fourteenth Amendment's
effect on state sovereign immunity and the non-effect of Article 1:
text, purpose, intent, and functionality. 301 She dismissed text because
''the Fourteenth Amendment no more explicitly addresses the
Eleventh Amendment than it does the Commerce Clause."302 She also

299. See id. at 1259 (''This essay asks why we should not read other preexisting parts of the
Constitution-including Article I powers of Congress-as having been modified by the Fourteenth
Amendment as well .... Considering Congress' Article I powers together with and in the light of
Congress' Fourteenth Amendment powers might lead to the conclusion that, where Congress is seeking
to remove barriers to the participation in the national economy of historically disadvantaged groups like
women or racial minorities, its Article I Commerce Clause powers should be read in light of the later
Constitution's commitments to equality."); id. at 1261 ("And if, as the Court held in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, the Fourteenth Amendment implicitly modified the Eleventh Amendment-which the Court has
repeatedly asserted in recent years to be an important pan of the federalism protections for states-why
has the Fourteenth Amendment not also modified the scope of federal powers under Article I of the
Constitution?") (footnote omitted); id. at 1264 ("If the Fourteenth Amendment modified the Eleventh
Amendment, why could it not also have modified Article l's enumerations of national powers?"); id at
1269 ("[C]hronology does not explain why the Fourteenth Amendment has not modified Article I
powers in ways relevant to the scope of national power to promote equality of citizenship, as the
Fourteenth Amendment is deemed to have modified the Eleventh Amendment and related sovereign
immunity doctrines.").
300. See id. at 1259 ("This approach would support a longer chain of connection than might otherwise
be permitted under United States v. Lopez and lead to a different result in United States v. Morrison.
Finally, the essay raises the question of whether reading Article I powers in light of the Fourteenth
Amendment's commitment of national citizenship might afford a basis (without having to overrule
Seminole Tribe) for permitting congressional abrogation of state immunity from suit under Article I
statutes.").
30 I. See id. at 1269.
302. See id.
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dismissed purpose because Article I grants of power, such as the
dormant Commerce Clause, constrain the states just as the Fourteenth
Amendment does? 03 These are really two quite different arguments:
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not speak to state sovereign
immunity any more than it speaks to Article I and that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not speak to constraining state power any more
than Article I does.
These two issues form a clearer picture through vectoral lenses.
Part of the problem stems from the vectoral dualism of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Article I, like section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
is composed of predominantly horizontal vectors. In contrast, state
sovereign immunity, like section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, is
a vertical vector. Thus, as vectoral kin, section 5 and state sovereign
immunity have stronger relationships and effects upon each other
than either has with Article I. Similarly, section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Article I inform each other more than either speaks
to state sovereign immunity because they are both horizontal vectors.
Thus, Professor Jackson's first argument, that the Fourteenth
Amendment no more addresses state sovereign immunity than Article
I does, is not so simple. Section I no more addresses state sovereign
immunity than does Article I (indeed, it addresses it far less), but
section 5 does. Section 5, as a vertical vector, clearly augments
federal power with respect to vertical federalism issues such as state
sovereign immunity. Section 5 does not, without some clear
reference, affect the horizontal vectors of Article I. Any such
reference to Article I is absent from section 5, which only permits
enforcement of the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. By its own terms, it is a vertical vector relating only to
the Fourteenth Amendment's horizontal limitations on the states. 304
303. See id. at 1270.
304. The Fourteenth Amendment could have altered the jurisdictional grant of Article III in historical
ways similar to those suggested by Professor Jackson. Before the Civil War, general federal jurisdiction
extended only to diversity actions. Michael G. Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional
Actions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, ISll (1989). In 1875, Congress enacted a
general federal question jurisdiction statute based on the reshaped understanding of federalism and the
federal courts' role in enforcing civil rights. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 216 (Sth ed.
2000). While there is no indication that antebellum Congresses doubted that Article Ill reached federal
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Section 5, therefore, affects state immunity with respect to Fourteenth
Amendment issues but does not itself speak to Article I.
The second argument, that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
speak to constraining state power any more than Article I does, is
incomplete without the vertical half of the vectoral analysis. The
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I
both constrain state regulatory power through horizontal
mechanisms. 305 However, section 5 gives the federal government a
strong vertical enforcement power against the states that is very
different from the horizontal vectors of Article I. The closest Article I
analogy would be the Necessary and Proper Clause, which is
confined to the execution of the affirmative horizontal powers of the
federal government,306 not vertical enforcement of negative
restrictions on the states. 307
The Supremacy Clause, a vertical power, is also overpowered by
the vertical resistance vector of state sovereign immunity. 308 Section

question cases, the congressional expansion of federal jurisdiction does seem to be a flexing of
newfound strength. Although intriguing, such a consideration is beyond the scope of this Article.
305. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I ("No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ... ."),with id. amend. XIV,§ I ("No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
306. See id art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the power "(t)o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States").
307. The Court has resolved that state sovereignty limits the Necessary and Proper Clause in the same
way as any other Article I power. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732-33 (1999); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997). The underlying basis for state resistance may be direct
limitations on that Clause alone, rather than on Article III or Article I in general. The possibility that
section 5, as a vertical vector, infuses the Necessary and Proper Clause, also a vertical vector, with the
same abrogation power is intriguing, but the language of section 5 does not permit extension beyond the
other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment so easily. For some commentary on the effect of the
Fourteenth Amendment on the constitutionality of federal commands, see Evan H. Caminker, Printz,
State Sovereignty, and the Limits ofFormalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199,236-42 (1997).
308. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 731 ("Appeal to the Supremacy Clause alone merely raises the question
whether a law is a valid exercise of the national power."); see also Dodson, Metes & Bounds, supra note
8, at 752 ("If the Supremacy Clause does not permit overriding state sovereign immunity under the
authority of Article I statutes, then, ipso facto, neither does it for laws made under the authority of other
provisions of the Constitution. In effect, Seminole Tribe and its progeny can perhaps be more
appropriately read not as Article I cases, or even as Eleventh Amendment cases, but rather as Supremacy
Clause cases: that the Supremacy Clause alone does not contemplate the abrogation of state sovereign
immunity."). The possibility exists, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment may have strengthened
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5 is an enforcement mechanism with vertical federalism force over
and above mere preemption. The Fourteenth Amendment speaks to
the vertical enforcement of horizontal constriction of the states to a
greater extent than any part of the original Constitution.
Although vectoral federalism permits a principled distinction
between the Fourteenth Amendment's effect on the Eleventh
Amendment and its hypothetical alteration of Article I powers,
Professor Jackson's original query remains unanswered. Combining
horizontal and vertical federalism vectors, could not section 1 have
incorporated certain Article I rights into its purview and made them
enforceable under section 5? The Due Process Clause is insufficient
under current doctrine because that Clause only incorporates
"fundamental" rights protected by the Constitution. 309 As Professor
Jackson astutely recognizes, the Privileges or Immunities Clause
appears to empower Congress to define, through its Article I powers,
civil rights of national citizenship which would then be enforceable
through section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 310 After all, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
originally paralleled the tamer Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV but was changed to reflect an intent to incorporate "other
and different privileges and immunities . . . which were not
limitations on the power of the States before the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment."311
A large obstacle stands in the way of the vindication of that
theory-the Slaughter-House Cases, 312 which effectively eviscerated

the Supremacy Clause in vertical federalism ways. Cf supra note 307 (making the point with respect to
the Sweeping Clause).
309. Compare, e.g., Fla Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
642-43 (1999) (holding the Enforcement Clause applicable only to the Due Process Clause protections,
not those created by statute), with Dodson, Metes & Bounds, supra note 8, at 762-63 (listing the civil
rights contained in the Bill of Rights that have been incorporated by the Due Process Clause). The idea
that the Due Process Clause altered the Bill of Rights makes sense because both deal with fundamental
civil rights of, and fundamental fairness to, citizens. Reading the Fourteenth Amendment as expanding
Congress' Article I powers, such as the Commerce Clause power, to fit the purposes of the Due Process
Clause is an entirely different matter.
310. See Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, supra note 5, at 1304.
311. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
312. 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1872).
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the Clause. 313 Nevertheless, the Privileges or Immunities Clause is
experiencing academic revival,314 and even some members of the
Court might be willing to revisit its impact. 315 Although I share
Professor Jackson's belief that the Court is unlikely to expand the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as far as to link section 5 abrogation
to Article I causes of action, 316 vectoral federalism suggests that
perhaps the Court should at least consider it.
CONCLUSION

Vectoral federalism takes a pictorial representation of two basic
but fundamentally different forms of federalism. Horizontal
federalism, in which the national and state governments compete for
regulatory power over individuals, involves the extent of the national
and state powers. Vertical federalism, in which the national
government attempts to exercise power directly over the states and in
313. See id. at 77-78 (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not "transfer the security and
protection of all the civil rights [previously mentioned) from the States to the Federal government," and
instead interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause to refer only to those rights uniquely associated
with national citizenship). But see Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporation Straight: A
Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643 (2000) (arguing that the SlaughterHouse Cases need not be read as stripping the Privileges or Immunities Clause of all efficacy).
314. See Farber & Muench, supra note 66, at 275-77; Kaczorowski, supra note 65; Newsom, supra
note 313. William J. Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities" .Seriously: A Call to Expand the
Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153,223 (2002).
315. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503-04 (1999).
316. To permit the expansion of an enumerated power beyond what Article I expressly permits would
threaten the very concept of limited government to which the majority strongly adheres. See United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995); cf Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. I, 40
(1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If private
suits against States, though not permitted under Article Ill (by virtue of the understanding represented by
the Eleventh Amendment), are nonetheless permitted under the Commerce Clause, or under some other
Article I grant of federal power, then there is no reason why the other limitations of Article III cannot be
similarly exceeded. That Article would be transformed from a comprehensive description of the
permissible scope of federal judicial authority to a mere default disposition, applicable unless and until
Congress prescribes more expansive authority in the exercise of one of its Article I powers. That is not
the regime the Constitution establishes."). Indeed, the Court has pointedly rejected an interpretation of
sectionS as expanding the rights contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 527-28 (1997) ("There is language in our opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966), which could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that
expands the rights contained in [section] I of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is not a necessary
interpretation, however, or even the best one.") (parallel citations omitted). How much less willing
would the Court be to expand enumerated powers?
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which the states attempt to resist that power, involves the relative
strengths of the national and state powers. These two federalism
forms are generally different and distinct inquiries.
Viewing the various federalism doctrines through a vectoral lens
helps to understand them and their relationships to each other.
Preliminary vectoral analysis suggests that the Court may be
unwittingly-and erroneously--confusing the two forms and that
separating out the vectoral components and attributes would clarify
and unify the Court's federalism jurisprudence.
I have not attempted to address all of the implications that a
vectoral federalism analysis might have on the issues discussed in
this Article. This discussion is merely preliminary, and the
framework is untested. Whether the vectoral principles will survive
further scrutiny and whether they even apply to issues such as habeas
corpus, federal appellate review, abstention, or preemption remains to
be seen. At the very least, vectoral federalism provides a new forum
for future discussion.

